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CURING THE MASS TORT SETTLEMENT
MALAISE
Noah Smith-Drelich*
To settle the thousands of claims arising from the defective
painkiller Vioxx, Merck Pharmaceuticals brokered an agreement, not
with the Vioxx plaintiffs but with their lawyers. This agreement required
the plaintiffs’ lawyers to recommend settlement to all of their clients
and to withdraw if any of those clients declined: plaintiffs’ lawyers
could either settle all of their claims or none. Through this unusual
arrangement, made without the involvement of the plaintiffs and outside
of any formal judicial supervision, Merck was able to craft a favorable
settlement group that mimicked a Rule 23 class.
This Article explores the Vioxx Agreement as but the first
consequence of the Supreme Court’s restrictive mass tort class
certification jurisprudence. Starting with Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Court has repeatedly
disapproved of lower courts’ broad readings of Rule 23 and denied
mass tort class certification—even where justice appears to demand a
class action. Now, with so little flexibility in Rule 23’s requirements,
few mass tort plaintiffs can hope to file suit as a Rule 23 class.
By removing a crucial tool for mass tort litigators, the Supreme
Court has begun to push the resolution of mass torts out of the formal
judicial system and into private contractual arrangements like the
Vioxx Agreement. Although agreements like this may appear to be an
adequate replacement for Rule 23 actions, they are far from it. Placing
a substantial proportion of group litigation outside of a judicially
controlled framework will lead to a fundamental shift in the carefully
drawn balance between the interests of plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ lawyers,
defendants, and society. Defendants will benefit from the ability to craft

* Noah Smith-Drelich is a graduate of Stanford Law School and spent the last year
clerking on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He is currently clerking on a federal district court.
Thanks are due to the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker and the Honorable Jay S. Bybee, Professors
Janet Alexander, Howard Erichson, and Nora Engstrom, and Andrew Prout, Maggie McKinley,
Julie Slater, and Harker Rhodes, IV for their enormous help in the writing of this Article.
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desirable settlement classes since plaintiffs’ lawyers will face the choice
between maximizing their clients’ interests or their own gains—all
without effective judicial oversight. Plaintiffs, and ultimately society,
will bear the brunt of the changes brought about by replacing Rule 23
settlements with agreements like the Vioxx Agreement, as unjust
settlements and systemic under-deterrence of future negligence will
result.
Previous scholarship has focused on either the ethical problems
inherent in the Vioxx Agreement or the difficulties that prospective mass
tort classes now face in seeking class certification. This Article analyzes
these issues together and proposes that a proliferation of “Vioxx
Agreements” is both inevitable and undesirable. This Article then
presents a solution to this overlooked, but substantial, emerging
problem: much of the deterrence value inherent in group litigation may
be preserved in private settlements by aggressively sanctioning
plaintiffs’ lawyers for even minor ethical violations in the context of
Vioxx Agreements. Rule 23 is carefully crafted to prevent abuses of
mass adjudication, and may therefore effectively guide regulators in
sanctioning those abuses most harmful to plaintiffs and society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1990s, obese and overweight Americans flocked to
Fen-Phen, the newest miracle cure for the love handle. Fen-Phen
promised what not even the traditional remedies of diet and exercise
could deliver: an average of thirty pounds of rapid weight loss.1 An
estimated six million Americans took Fen-Phen between 1992 and
1997, and approximately eighteen million prescriptions were written
in 1996 alone.2 Tragically, weight loss was only the second most
significant effect of Fen-Phen on the human body: fully one-third of
Fen-Phen’s patients developed damaged heart valves, a potentially
life-threatening health complication.3 Fen-Phen was pulled from the
market in 1997 and a flood of litigation quickly followed.4 The
manufacturers and distributors of Fen-Phen were repeatedly drawn
into court; 50,000 Fen-Phen claims would be eventually filed.5 The
potential burden of this litigation was crippling, not only for
defendants, but for the judicial system, which was not equipped to
handle cases on this scale.
Many things must go wrong for a mass tort such as the Fen-Phen
disaster to occur: regulatory fail-safes must fail, medical knowledge
must come up short, and companies must gamble with the health and
safety of their customers. Tort law can powerfully deter this last, but
arguably most significant, factor in mass torts. Companies will
design safer products, use more care in production lines, and better
publicize what unavoidable risks are associated with their goods
when tort awards and settlements increase the cost of risky practices.
For tort law to accomplish this goal, however, tort victims must

1. See Gina Kolata, How Fen-Phen, a Diet ‘Miracle,’ Rose and Fell, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/23/science/how-fen-phen-a-diet-miracle-rose
-and-fell.html; Brad Walters, 5 Things You Need to Know About Fen-Phen, LIVESTRONG.COM
(Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.livestrong.com/article/4811-need-fen-phen/. Fen-Phen boasted a
weight-loss rate three times that of diet and exercise, and twice that of even other diet drugs. Id.
2. Gale White, What’s the “Skinny” on Fen-Phen, FINDLAW (Mar. 3, 2008),
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/what-s-the-skinny-on-fen-phen.html.
3. Kolata, supra note 1.
4. Some litigation preceded the removal of Fen-Phen from the market. See ALICIA MUNDY,
DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC
STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2001).
5. Walters, supra note 1.
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actually sue. Sophisticated companies will recognize when certain
categories of victims do not seek legal remedy for their injury, and
will therefore be under-deterred with respect to such victims. Victims
of mass torts represent one such potential group: because causation,
liability, and damages are often particularly difficult and expensive
to prove in the context of mass torts, mass tort victims rarely
instigate individual lawsuits.6
Rule 23 changed this, permitting the consolidation of small
claims in class actions, and, therefore, broadening the reach of tort
justice to include plaintiffs who, individually, do not have viable
claims.7 This is far from the extent of Rule 23’s benefits, however.
Rule 23 is carefully calibrated to balance the interests of plaintiffs,
defendants, and society as a whole. Rule 23 provides plaintiffs a path
to cost-effective recovery for their injuries, while adding a layer of
protection from unscrupulous attorneys who do not act in the
plaintiffs’ best interests.8 Rule 23 promises defendants a path to
relief from the seemingly unpredictable and unlimited liability
associated with individually litigated mass tort claims, as well as

6. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal-Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 968 (1991) (noting that “[n]o claim
in a mass tort litigation will have value until plaintiffs are able to establish causation, liability and
damages”). This Article uses the term “mass tort” to refer to mass personal injury torts: instances
in which the negligent behavior of a small number of defendants has physically injured many
parties. Such accidents may often be composed of toxic tort, products liability, or failure-to-warn
claims. “Mass torts” of this nature may be distinguished from antitrust, security, or workplacediscrimination mass litigation, where a financial injury has occurred.
7. Rule 23 may not even go far enough. For the argument that the private incentives to
litigate in a class are often inadequate to achieve the desired social benefits, see John Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of the Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
8. This Article makes a number of assumptions: that plaintiffs generally have little
information and are therefore largely at the mercy of their lawyers; that plaintiffs’ lawyers are
economic actors, motivated by primarily financial ends; and that the threat of tort liability can act
as a deterrent. Coffee, Kalven, Rosenfield, Rosenberg, and others explore these assumptions in
more depth. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in Large Class Actions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Harry
Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 684 (1941); John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class Action, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1226
(1995); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney Role in Class Actions and
Derivative Suits: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1991); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts]; David
Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
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from the cost of defending a multitude of separate lawsuits. And by
allowing even the smallest individual injuries to be litigated, the Rule
provides substantial deterrence while sparing society from the
enormous cost of the flood of individual claims that inevitably follow
from a mass tort. Rule 23’s consolidation of mass torts benefits
plaintiffs, defendants, and society alike.9
Following the Supreme Court’s strict reading of Rule 23 starting
with Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor10 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.,11 however, class actions are no longer viable in the mass tort
context: neither society’s need for the mass adjudication of mass
torts nor the practical difficulty most mass tort plaintiffs face in
satisfying Rule 23(a) can justify courts’ relaxation of Congress’s
class certification requirements.12 By removing a crucial tool for
mass tort litigators, Amchem and Ortiz have begun to push the
resolution of mass torts almost entirely out of the formal judicial
system and into private contractual arrangements. One such
arrangement is the recent Vioxx Agreement, a creatively structured
non-class aggregate settlement that required lawyers to recommend
the deal to their clients and to withdraw from the Agreement if any
of their clients declined.13 This consequence of Amchem and Ortiz
has received little scholarly attention.14 Yet, if left unchecked, it will
9. Put more precisely, Rule 23 carries potential for a win-win. Much scholarship has been
devoted to discussing Rule 23’s shortcomings. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL
GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 253 (1987) (criticizing the mandatory
nature of (b)(2) class actions because it is “more likely than in the (b)(3) cases that the interests of
the group’s members will conflict and will be least amenable to abstract assessment”); Allan
Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvibility”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions,
58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1023 (2005) (noting “diversity among the circumstances of individual
class members and judicial reactions to that diversity” as “overlooked source[s] of controversial
shortcomings in the class action device”); John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—
What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS C. L. REV. 323 (2005) (cataloguing a number of objections to
Rule 23).
10. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
11. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
12. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.B.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the Agreement, see infra Part III.
14. The impacts of Amchem and Ortiz on non-class aggregate settlements and the tort
deterrence equation have been addressed only tangentially in the literature. See, e.g., Deborah R.
Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899
(2002) [hereinafter Hensler, As Time Goes By] (examining whether Amchem and Ortiz “have
achieved the aims the objectors to the settlements sought” in the asbestos context); Deborah R.
Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883 (2007)
(describing how mass toxic tort litigation has evolved to include more lawyers, fewer settlements,
and diminished “bet the company” risks for defendants); Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass
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significantly change the tort deterrence equation. Although at first
the terms of these private agreements may largely mirror, in
appearance, the terms of class action settlements, the removal of
mass tort settlements from the judicial system will deprive plaintiffs
of the security that Rule 23 provides.15 Without the threat of class
certification, non-class aggregate settlements will become further and
further removed from the balance and protections that Rule 23’s
structure provides. Judges may still be involved in some capacity, if
only to provide parties to the settlement with a modicum of
legitimacy, but left to the free market, the shift to private settlement
agreements will ultimately benefit defendants the most.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses how mass
litigation has evolved to become an important tool for resolving mass
torts, and analyzes how Rule 23’s construction carefully balances the
competing interests brought into play by mass adjudication. Part III
describes how, despite this careful legislative balancing, the judiciary

Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
306 (2011) (using, as its example of the future of mass litigation, the 2005 Dutch Act on the
Collective Settlement of Mass Claims, an administrative solution); Samuel Issacharoff, Shocked:
Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925
(2001) (exploring the consequences of Amchem and Ortiz through a theoretical lens); Francis E.
McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 884
(2001) (anticipating, in a single short paragraph, the creation of class action surrogates like the
Vioxx Agreement in the aftermath of Amchem and Ortiz, but providing no discussion of the
practical or normative consequences of such surrogates); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Quasi-Class Method of Managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal
(N.Y.U. Law and Economics, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=nyu_lewp (analyzing the structural possibilities and
consequences of MDLs, including the Vioxx MDL); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2009) (proposing a “do no harm” alternative to the
“identity-of-interests” requirement from Amchem); cf. JENNY STEEL & WILLEM H. VAN BOOM,
MASS JUSTICE: CHALLENGES OF REPRESENTATION AND DISTRIBUTION (2011) (offering
restrained praise for the Vioxx Agreement’s hybrid approach); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2010) (exploring the ethical
issues of the Vioxx Agreement); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing
Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010) (describing the ethical problems associated with “allor-nothing settlements,” a category that includes the Vioxx Agreement).
15. For a discussion of the importance of Rule 23’s protections, see the Supreme Court’s
recent Rule 23 jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558
(2011); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621. In practice, however, the security
provided by Rule 23 may not be adequate to fully protect plaintiffs. See generally Robert H.
Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of Representation”
Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671 (2004) (analyzing shortcomings in the judiciary’s
application of Rule 23(a)(4)). This Article asserts that those protections offered in its absence will
be even less effective.
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significantly broadened Rule 23’s reach in response to the mass torts
of the 1980s and 1990s, ultimately leading the Supreme Court to
return Rule 23 to its pre-mass torts construction in Amchem and
Ortiz. Part IV discusses how Amchem and Ortiz’s restriction on class
certification has spurred plaintiffs and defendants to seek resolution
of mass torts outside of a judicially controlled framework,16 and how
this shift towards extra-judicial resolution will ultimately benefit
defendants and lead to under-deterrence. Finally, Part V concludes
with a novel, and counter-intuitive, solution: jurisdictions can attain
near-optimal mass tort deterrence, even in the absence of permissive
class certification, by aggressively sanctioning plaintiffs’ attorneys
who do not act in the best interests of their clients when settling class
settlements outside of Rule 23’s protections.
II. THE APPEAL OF GROUP LITIGATION,
FROM THE MEDIEVAL TO THE MODERN
This Article begins by exploring the many advantages provided
by Rule 23 in the context of group litigation. This discussion is
integral to understanding why agreements similar to the Vioxx
Agreement are likely to propagate in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s ever-more-limiting Rule 23 jurisprudence. But it also shows
why such extrajudicial agreements are so dangerous. Rule 23 is
carefully calibrated to balance the interests of plaintiffs, plaintiffs’
lawyers, defendants, and society in group litigation.
A. A Medieval Tool Matures
Group litigation has been a part of the Anglo legal system since
the thirteenth century.17 This unusual judicial instrument first arose
as an administrability tool of the nobility. Executing a legal judgment
against an entire community was far easier for medieval monarchs
than attempting to secure and enforce many individual judgments.18
Difficulties with administration, communication, and transportation

16. At least one settlement has already made use of the Vioxx Agreement’s unusual
structure: the GM Rice settlement reached in 2011. See GMB Settlement Agreement, GM RICE
SETTLEMENT CLAIMS ADMIN. WEBSITE, http://gmricesettlement.com/BY_Un-secure/MDL
_Settlement_Agreement.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
17. Yeazell, supra note 9.
18. Id.
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forced early English sovereigns to regularly turn to group litigation
for governance throughout much of the late Middle Ages.19
Centuries later, group litigation retains its salience. Class
actions, the contemporary manifestation of this ancient device, are
useful in a wide range of contexts, including the resolution of mass
accidents.20 As the legal system developed, group litigation ceased to
be used by the government: the modern administrative state assumed
much of the role previously fulfilled by group litigation. Yet,
agencies have proven ill-equipped to handle the overwhelming task
of investigating and prosecuting safety issues, instead relying heavily
on the research produced by potential defendants to determine
whether products are safe for the marketplace.21
Thus, the ancient prosecutorial mantle of group litigation has
been passed to plaintiffs’ lawyers, who, as a result, are alternatively
lauded as “private attorneys general”22 and vilified as “ambulance
chasers.” This seeming contradiction stems, in large part, from
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ unique funding model. Rather than billing by the
hour or even by the lawsuit, plaintiffs’ lawyers typically take a fixed
percentage of any recovery or settlement—30 or 35 percent is

19. Id. at 82–86.
20. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1995) (noting that “[d]efendants have not only adopted the class
action as their preferred means of resolving their mass tort liabilities, but have also actually begun
to solicit plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring such class actions (as a condition of settling other pending
litigation between them)”); see also David Crump, What Really Happens During Class
Certification? A Primer for the First-Time Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LITIG. 1, 8–9 (1990). One
example of this is the class action filed over the defective Bjork-Shiley heart valve, which was
brought originally as a nationwide class action, but extended to a global class action on
defendants’ insistence. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 154–55 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal
dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993); Michael Schachner, Global Settlements Draw Praise,
Scorn, BUS. INS., Oct. 10, 1994, at 1.
21. A recent study shows that agencies, such as the FDA, can only handle a small percentage
of possible claims brought to them and are woefully understaffed. See REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_fda%20report%20on
%20science%20and%20technology.pdf.
22. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179 (2001). Professor Hensler
notes that although this characterization may ascribe more altruism to plaintiffs’ lawyers than
what is warranted, the impact of lawsuits in such contexts is to internalize negative societal
externalities—regardless of whether a plaintiff’s lawyer acts out of a motivation to do good or to
make money. Id.
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standard for suits brought individually.23 This creates strong
incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to not merely litigate, but to seek
out and investigate potential mass torts since the lucrative prize of a
class action judgment far outweighs even substantial investigative
and litigation costs.24 Consequently, plaintiffs’ lawyers, wielding the
threat of a large lawsuit, have become a powerful arbiter of safety in
modern society.
Not all of the incentives that contingency fees create are
positive, however. The contingency fee-funding model means that
plaintiffs’ lawyers must balance the prospective cost of litigation
against the possibility of recovery. This creates a financial incentive
for plaintiffs’ lawyers to accept early settlement offers, which
provide lawyers with a guaranteed payment without the cost or risk
of trial. Moreover, plaintiffs who seek non-financial remedies may
find their lawyers less than amenable to such arrangements. Because
victims of mass torts are typically neither sophisticated nor repeat
legal players, they litigate at the mercy of their lawyers, and when
the interests of plaintiffs’ lawyers are not aligned with those of the
plaintiffs that they represent, it is too often the plaintiffs whose
interests are harmed.
B. The Broad Appeal of Group Litigation
One other challenge that contingency fee litigation presents is
that the prospective financial award of a settlement or judgment must
be sufficient to justify the time and cost of litigation for the
plaintiffs’ lawyer. Individual victims of mass torts, however, often

23. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost
Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2013); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011); see also David Giacalone, Contingency Fees (Pt. 3): Do
“Standard” Fees Exist?, F/K/A . . . THE ARCHIVES (Apr. 8, 2006, 2:34 AM), http://blogs.law
.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/contingency-fees-pt-3-do-standard-fees-exist/. Mass litigators generally
take smaller percentages of the recovery, but due to the large size of mass judgments, the reward
of representing a class of plaintiffs can be even more disproportionate in relation to the time and
expense of litigation.
24. This is not to say that all plaintiffs’ lawyers are purely economic agents; plaintiffs’
lawyers are also influenced by non-economic external factors such as “moral duties, altruism, or
virtue.” Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Response, Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 55, 58
(2010). For the purposes of exploring Amchem, Ortiz, and the Vioxx Agreement, however, this
Article will treat plaintiffs’ lawyers as predominantly economically motivated. To the extent that
plaintiffs’ lawyers are actually driven by other motives, the effects described throughout this
Article will be diminished.
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have suffered only speculative injury, and require extensive
discovery and expert testimony to develop their claims; many
justiciable mass tort injuries are of an uncertain value, are expensive
to litigate, and are therefore unattractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers.25
Although individual mass tort claims tend to be far from
insignificant, few plaintiffs’ lawyers will spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars in discovery, expert witness, and time costs to
secure a judgment that may count only in the tens of thousands of
dollars.26 Even cases with relatively certain judgments will be
refused by lawyers when the value of recovery is too small to
sufficiently cover the costs incurred in securing that recovery.27
Modern group litigation seeks to address this challenge. Class
action lawsuits provide a vehicle for making the litigation of small
claims viable. By aggregating numerous small claims into a single
larger claim, class actions multiply the potential reward of litigation
without similarly multiplying the costs. Many potential mass tort
plaintiffs thus have no workable path to recovery outside of group
litigation.28
25. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 884 (“Although some plaintiffs in a mass tort action may
have suffered disproportionately large injuries and thus have a sufficient stake in the action to
justify expending funds to monitor the attorney, most do not.”); Rosenberg, Class Actions for
Mass Torts, supra note 8, at 563 (describing mass torts as “exceedingly, if not prohibitively,
expensive to litigate”); see also RAND CORP., Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation
(1995), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9021/index1.html (noting that
issues such as interdependent values, difficulty proving causation, and future injury lower the
value of many mass-tort injuries to plaintiffs’ lawyers).
26. The exception to this rule comes when plaintiffs use litigation as a strategic business
tool, as is common in the intellectual property arena. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants
Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012), https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford
-technology-law-review/online/giants-among-us (describing the rise of patent mass aggregators
and the use of patents both defensively and offensively as a business tool).
27. Cf. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485,
1486 (2009) (describing and analyzing the rise of “settlement mills”: firms that specialize in a
high-volume practice of low-risk cases).
28. For examples and discussions of this, see, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant
Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Adjudicating
Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1984);
Anne Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1369, 1395–96 (1985); Don V. Jernberg, Insurance for Environmental and Toxic
Risks: Basic Analysis of the Gap Between Liability and Coverage, 34 FED’N INS. COUNS. Q. 123
(1984). This same obstacle to recovery may apply in “diminished recovery cases.” See, e.g.,
Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 1989); Garza v. Sporting Goods
Properties, Inc., No. CIV. A. SA–93–CA–108, 1996 WL 56247 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 1996); Am.
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 527–28 (Ct. App. 1995); Anthony v.
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Ct. App. 1972). On the other hand, many mass torts—
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Modern class actions retain the efficiency, administrability, and
finality advantages that justified their precursors and, thus, are not
merely a device used by plaintiffs, but one that is often preferred by
defendants.29 First, class actions present an efficient alternative to
individual suits. Class action defendants seek to control the costs of
their mistakes, which means limiting not merely their legal liability
but the price of being sued. The expense of litigation defense has
soared over the past century, as hourly billable rates have steadily
grown. What was once an incidental cost of doing business has
become a multi-billion dollar industry.30 In fact, a 1985 RAND
Institute for Civil Justice study revealed that the amount of the
recovery now makes up less than half of the total cost of litigation.31
Because defense lawyers typically bill by the hour, defendants have a
significant monetary incentive to resolve litigation quickly. The
substantial costs of expert witnesses and discovery only heighten the
financial impact of taking a personal injury case to trial. Second,
class actions are more administrable than individual lawsuits.
Hundreds of suits requiring thousands of lawyers and experts are
neither quick nor cheap to resolve. Although a single class action
lawsuit may nevertheless be more difficult and expensive to litigate
than any one individual lawsuit, class actions have substantially

such as in the asbestos context—cause high value injuries that are attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers
even as individual cases. See, e.g., Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (1990).
29. See, e.g., HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7509 (4th ed. 1977);
Steven M. Morgan, Finality in Litigation, 1, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/96215790
/Finality-in-Litigation (describing the many reasons why “[u]sing the class action in this fashion
could be advantageous for a Defendant,” including the facts that “it would involve a single,
unified adjudication, would prevent relitigation of the same issues, would close-off avenues for
new, subsequent Plaintiffs, and a settlement with a representative party could bind a whole class
of affected parties”). It is also worth noting that classes of defendants are still permitted under
Rule 23. They now comprise, however, only a small fraction of all class actions. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all members . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also David E. Rigney, Annotation, Permissibility of
Action Against a Class of Defendants Under Rule 23(b)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
85 A.L.R. FED. 263 (1987).
30. Joni Hersch & Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9
AM. LAW ECON. REV. 330 (2007).
31. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORP., COSTS AND COMPENSATION
PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/reports/2006/R3391.pdf (explaining that 37 percent of the cost of litigation is legal and expense
fees, 15 percent is lost time value, and 2 percent is court costs. The remaining 46 percent in 1985
was the payment made to plaintiffs, whether via settlement or court-ordered award).
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lower litigation expenses for defendants than the alternative of
countless individual suits. Third, class actions offer defendants the
possibility of finality. Because litigation generates significant bad
publicity and ill will for defendants, defendants often want nothing
more than to put lawsuits—especially class action lawsuits—behind
them.32 The desire to achieve finality in litigation is more than
publicity-based, however; corporations must be able to plan for the
future and, thus, unpredictability in prospective litigation costs also
takes a substantial toll. Class actions, which may bind absent
plaintiffs in addition to present plaintiffs, provide defendants not
only with a quick and efficient means of resolving lawsuits but with
a degree of finality that would otherwise be impossible to ensure.
The most significant advantage provided by group litigation,
however, may be to society. The societal cost of mass torts—whether
counted in pain and suffering, lost earnings potential, or decreased
consumer trust—is enormous. Privately adjudicating such losses
through class action lawsuits provides for closer-to-optimal levels of
deterrence. From a law and economics standpoint, optimal deterrence
is achieved when tort law fully internalizes the cost of the tort—for
example when the marginal cost of an extra dollar of precaution
equals the marginal benefit of an extra dollar of accident reduction.33
Prospective defendants will take cost-justified precautions in
response to group litigation, leading to a safer, healthier, and happier
society. Where administrative agencies cannot or will not act, class
actions nevertheless provide a market-driven deterrence alternative
without regard to the size of individual plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover,
group litigation relieves the already overworked court system from
the burden of trying thousands, or tens of thousands, of duplicative
32. James M. Anderson, Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential
Settlements: Lessons from Bayer’s Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy (Rand Institute for Civil
Justice, Working Paper No. WR-617-ICJ, 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/working
_papers/WR617.html (describing how Bayer’s reputational concern impacted the course of the
cerivastatin litigation).
33. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878–79 (1999) (discussing the concept of optimal deterrence,
and noting “if a defendant will definitely be found liable for the harm for which he is responsible,
the proper magnitude of damages is equal to the harm the defendant has caused”). As Professors
Polinsky & Shavell recognize, tort law generally provides sub-optimal deterrence. Id. Therefore,
one consequence of the class action structure increasing the viability of plaintiff claims—and
therefore the likely cost of tortfeasing to potential defendants—is that deterrence is increased to
closer-to-optimal levels.
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cases. Consequently, class action lawsuits are a powerful tool for
creating societal good through their promotion of judicial efficiency
and their role in deterring societal harms.34
The mutually beneficial nature of class actions may be at its
greatest in the context of class action settlements. Class action
settlements assure defendants a degree of finality that would
otherwise be impossible to achieve with individual suits, as class
settlements bind all members of a class who do not affirmatively optout—all without the litigation costs of trial or appeal.35 For plaintiffs
and plaintiffs’ lawyers, the aggregation of claims in group litigation
significantly raises the financial stakes, and thus, the guarantee of
even only a partial recovery will often prove attractive.36 Plaintiffs’
lawyers may therefore recoup a significant proportion of their
contingency fees through settlement without having to underwrite the
costs of trial or assume the risk of an unfavorable judgment.37
Courts, in turn, also welcome settlements as a means of reducing the
burdens that litigation places on an already overwhelmed judicial
system. On the whole, class action settlements represent an
apotheosis of efficiency; hundreds, if not thousands, of suits may be
resolved in one fell swoop without the need for a complicated and
lengthy trial.
This is not to say that settlement has no disadvantages: the
financial incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle can subvert the
aims of justice, particularly in the class action context.38 The
economics of group-settlement litigation, which often pit the
interests of defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers against the interests of
plaintiffs and society, could upset tort law’s deterrence function.
Although it is often defendants who instigate settlement talks,
settlements are not commonly formed only from a defendant’s sense
of obligation or guilt: settling is frequently a defendant’s best
business decision. In such circumstances, defendants often seek to
offer the smallest possible sum necessary to buy finality (taking into
34. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (5th ed. 2009).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
36. Unfortunately, this has created unfortunate incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle
cases even when not in the best interest of their clients. See infra Part II.
37. Frances E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 59 B.U. L. REV. 659,
663–64 (1989).
38. See infra Part II.

MASS TORT

Fall 2014]

4/21/2015 9:51 PM

MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS

15

account the costs of monetary and nonmonetary damages). Plaintiffs,
of course, need not accept defendants’ initial offers, and often do not.
Through their lawyers, plaintiffs have a financial incentive to seek
the highest settlement value that defendants are willing to agree to
(taking into account, once again, the value of both monetary and
nonmonetary damages). So long as plaintiffs’ lawyers fulfill this role
and zealously advocate for their clients, settlements will remain
widely used, wildly attractive, and an all-around good option for the
resolution of mass torts.39
It is when plaintiffs’ lawyers shirk in their duties as zealous
advocates that this bargaining breaks down and settlements are no
longer advantageous for plaintiffs or society. Plaintiffs, unlike
defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers, are usually not repeat players in
litigation and thus are relatively ignorant as to what constitutes a
good or fair settlement offer.40 This is known as the “agency cost
problem.”41 As Professor Coffee outlines, this can lead to
“sweetheart” settlements where plaintiffs lawyers urge plaintiffs to
accept settlements that are far smaller than what plaintiffs’ claim is
worth, in the hopes of avoiding the significant time required in trials
and appeals.42 It is too often that trusting clients accept such suboptimal arrangements.43
39. See infra Part II; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing judicial oversight of Rule 23
settlements).
40. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA]. PSLRA helps limit
abuses of the litigation system in the securities context. As one of its many reforms, the PSLRA
allows judges to decide the most adequate plaintiff in class actions and encourages greater
judicial scrutiny of lawyer conflicts of interest. Id.
41. Coffee, supra note 8, at 885; see also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899–900 (2d Cir.
1972); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964); Andrew Rosenfield, An
Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 114–17 (1976) (concluding
that statistical analyses of class-action settlements indicate that settlements result in pecuniary
gains to attorneys at the expense of the class).
42. Coffee, supra note 8 (describing, also, other problems that can arise from the plaintiffs’
lawyer-client relationship). These financial incentives can be so strong that Professor Coffee has
commented that “it is more accurate to describe the plaintiff’s attorney as an independent
entrepreneur than as an agent of the client.” Id. at 882–83.
43. See id. For example, a plaintiff may be offered a settlement of $30,000 for a claim likely
to yield a $100,000 recovery through trial. Assuming the plaintiff’s lawyer was working on a
standard one-third contingency fee, this would entail a $10,000 payment to the lawyer for her
time spent securing the settlement or a $33,000 payment for her time spent securing a trial
judgment. If the settlement offer required five hours of work from the plaintiff’s lawyer, but a
trial would require one hundred hours of work, the hourly benefits of settling ($2,000 per hour)
far outweigh the hourly benefits of going to trial ($330 per hour). Even assuming that a favorable
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The risk of financial cross-incentives diminishing plaintiffs’
quality of representation is greatest in the context of group
litigation.44 Since the time and costs of trial, the threat and
uncertainty of appeal, and the potential ultimate value of class
actions tend to be far higher than in individual lawsuits, plaintiffs’
lawyers have the greatest incentive to seek quick, cheap
resolutions.45 Moreover, many plaintiffs do not expect a recovery
sufficient to justify time or money spent monitoring their lawyers;
though some plaintiffs suffer disproportionately large injuries and are
therefore personally invested in the quality of their representation, it
is not uncommon for a substantial proportion of mass tort class
action plaintiffs to be, effectively, free riders.46 These issues are
further compounded by two additional related factors: no market
exists to regulate lawyer behavior, and because class action lawyers
typically solicit clients (and not the other way around), principal
preference plays a much smaller role than in typical agent-principal
relationships.47
Even those plaintiffs interested in monitoring their lawyers face
difficulties in class actions where plaintiffs’ lawyers act on behalf of
a significant number of plaintiffs whom they may never meet and,
thus, are one step further removed from the interests of many of their
clients. And because plaintiffs’ lawyers are typically paid on
contingency, a plaintiff who seeks only an apology or a promise of
changed behavior on the part of defendant may have difficulty
finding any representation at all. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are not paid in
apologies and may therefore persuade their clients that a small, sure,
settlement value is preferable to the prospective relief desired by
plaintiffs, even when it is not.48 The rewards of settlement, especially
in the class action context, may be great—but so are the risks.
trial judgment was all but assured, it would be financially rational, though not ethical, for the
lawyer to urge her client to accept the settlement offer despite the fact that settlement makes little
financial sense for a plaintiff in this situation.
44. See id. at 884.
45. Plaintiffs, similarly, are often sensitive to the significant investment of time and the
inherent uncertainty involved in group litigation. As has been discussed, but nevertheless bears
repeating, settlement often can be the optimal resolution of a class action.
46. Coffee, supra note 8, at 884.
47. Id. at 885–86.
48. This may be what happened in the proposed Ticketmaster settlement, where prospective
class members were provided $1.50 credits towards future Ticketmaster purchases while their
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C. Group Litigation Codified
Enter Rule 23. The contemporary evolution of group litigation
was completed by the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,49 which regulates the modern federal class
action.50 The protections that Rule 23 provides for plaintiffs,
defendants, and society as a whole are carefully constructed, and are
critical to the successful resolution of mass accidents en masse.
Crucially, the deterrence function of class actions depends on Rule
23’s precise execution. Rule 23 may not operate perfectly to
effectuate its goals but, as this section argues, its absence presents
greater risks than does its presence. Rule 23 is not an empty
procedural rule, and changing any of the safeguards integral to its
structure will have serious consequences for the deterrence of
potential mass tortfeasors.
1. Defining a Class Under Rule 23(a)
Rule 23(a) sets forth the qualifications that a group must possess
in order to be defined as a class.51 Because mass tort class actions
provide more deterrence than individual lawsuits,52 a permissive
reading of Rule 23(a) will result in additional classes being
certified—and therefore in greater deterrence. On the other hand, a
restrictive reading of Rule 23(a) will lead to fewer class certifications
and less deterrence.
attorneys won $16.5 million in legal fees. Andy Vuong, Judge Rejects Ticketmaster Settlement
Offering $1.50 Coupons to Consumers, $16.5 Million to Attorneys, DENVER POST
(Oct. 4, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/techknowbytes/2012/10/04/judge-rejects
-ticketmaster-settlement-offering-150-coupons-consumers-165-million-attorneys/6611/. The
proposed settlement was rejected by the presiding judge. Id.
49. The 1966 revisions created the modern version of Rule 23. See Yeazell, supra note 9, at
229; see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer Reader 324 (Spring 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
50. States frequently have class action statutes as well, but this Article focuses on Rule 23,
given its outsized influence on the modern class action.
51. Rule 23(a) reads, in its entirety:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
52. See discussion supra note 33.
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Rule 23(a) does not merely impact the deterrence function of
class actions, however. This gatekeeper of class certification also
ensures that the class action is both fair and justiciable. Although the
scaled economy of group litigation is efficient, it is not without its
costs: along with the benefits of grouping many individual claims
comes the risk that justice may not be done. This tension—between
optimal deterrence, and fairness and justiciability—is carefully
balanced by Rule 23(a)’s specific provisions.
Rule 23(a)’s first requirement—numerosity—ensures that the
class action vehicle will only be used when a sufficient number of
prospective plaintiffs have been injured such that individual lawsuits
would overwhelm the courts and defendants, and joinder is
impracticable.53 Because the class action format trades some degree
of specificity for efficiency, the numerosity requirement prevents
class certification in instances where defendants’, plaintiffs’, and
society’s interest in efficiency does not outweigh the benefits of
individual trials. Although permitting certification for less-numerous
classes could increase the deterrence function of class actions
(because more class actions will be certified), mass torts generally
include a large number of mass tort victims. Enforcement of Rule
23(a)’s numerosity requirement will therefore have little impact on
mass tort deterrence: it will not generally be the case that a mass tort
class action will not be certified because it fails to meet the
numerosity requirement.54
The second requirement—commonality—protects defendants by
prohibiting suit where prospective plaintiffs’ claims are not
sufficiently alike to be litigated as one claim.55 This ensures that
class actions are both fair and justiciable. Rule 23(a)(2) also has
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that “the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable”).
54. For a recent discussion of the numerosity requirement, albeit in a slightly different
context, see Julie Slater, Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification: How and When Should
“Significant Proof” Be Required Post-Dukes?, BYU L. REV. 1259 (2011).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011) (insisting that the
common question must be “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke”). There is some disagreement as to whether Dukes changed
or clarified Rule 23(a)(2). Compare Connor B., ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D.
Mass. 2011) (noting that Dukes clarified the law), with M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d
832 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that Dukes heightened the standard for commonality).
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significant deterrence consequences, however, as a lenient
application of the commonality requirement could lead to either
over-deterrence or under-deterrence. For example, over-deterrence
will result if plaintiffs are permitted to craft classes that include
unlike claims, compelling defendants (who lose) to pay for the
claims of class members whom they may not have wronged. And
under-deterrence will result if defendants can influence class
composition by crafting settlements that group a small number of
strong claims with weaker claims that define the recovery. On the
other hand, a too-strict application of the commonality requirement
will also lead to sub-optimal deterrence; no two injuries are exactly
identical, so requiring an unrealistic degree of commonality will
discourage class actions.56
The third provision of Rule 23(a) is typicality, which protects
both defendants and prospective plaintiffs by ensuring that the
named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class as a whole.
Defendants should not be subjected to the aggregated claims of a
weak class made strong by its named plaintiffs, and absent class
members should not be bound by a judgment reached on facts that
materially vary from their own.57 Because typicality serves
defendants and plaintiffs alike, a more permissive interpretation of
Rule 23(a)(3) may increase the unpredictability of class action
judgments but may not influence deterrence in one way or the
other.58 However, should either defendants or plaintiffs be
systematically permitted to craft classes with strategically atypical
named plaintiffs, rewards would become systematically skewed, and
either under-deterrence or over-deterrence will result.
Finally, Rule 23(a)(4)—adequacy of representation—provides
the class with some assurance that the lead lawyers are competent to
represent the interests of named and unnamed plaintiffs, and that
there are no conflicts of interest inherent to the class. Plaintiffs in
class actions may not even know that they are parties to a suit until
they have been notified of a prospective settlement or judgment and,
consequently, plaintiffs are especially vulnerable to unethical
56. See Slater, supra note 54.
57. Id.
58. Unpredictability may have its own impact on deterrence, but that is the subject for a
different paper.
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plaintiffs’ lawyers. Because the interests of plaintiffs and their
attorneys often do not align in class actions, a more permissive
interpretation of this requirement could interfere with the class
action’s deterrence function: plaintiffs’ attorneys who inadequately
represent the class may choose a modest private settlement over the
possibility of a large public judgment (that would require an
expensive trial), and will be less likely to seek non-monetary
remedies because of the compensation structure of the contingency
fee.59 More settlements and smaller remedies will result, as well as
agreements that restrict publicity. The sum total of these effects will
be sub-optimal deterrence.
2. Determining the Type of Class Under Rule 23(b)
If a prospective class meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, a judge
must then turn to Rule 23(b) to determine on what grounds the class
may be certified. Judges have three options, each of which is
carefully attuned to advancing important societal goals while
preventing misuse of group litigation. Whereas Rule 23(a) defines
the class being certified, Rule 23(b) limits the circumstances in
which a class action may be used. Permitting class certification in
circumstances other than those specifically delineated by 23(b) opens
the door to the co-option of group litigation by self-interested
parties.60 As with Rule 23(a) determinations, the deterrence value of
class action lawsuits will be influenced by how broadly or
restrictively courts apply Rule 23(b).
a. 23(b)(1) Certification
Rule 23(b)(1) permits class certification where “individual
adjudication of the controversy would prejudice either the party
opposing the class, (b)(1)(A), or the class members themselves,
(b)(1)(B).”61 Thus, if a judge determines that “inconsistent or varying
adjudications” will arise from individual suits, certification may be

59. See supra Part II.B.
60. It’s also possible that greater Rule 23(b) flexibility will lead to creative structures that
allow more justice. But, as I will discuss, the incentives and structures that define mass-tort
litigation will more likely drive non-Rule 23(b) settlements towards societally undesirable
outcomes. See infra Part IV.B.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1986).
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granted under 23(b)(1)(A).62 Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits
class certification where individual judgments will, as a practical
matter, preclude suit for other members of the class.63 This is
commonly the case when individual claims made against a limited
fund are likely to exhaust the fund before all claims are satisfied.64
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes have been very useful, and are most
widely used within the context of the limited-fund class.65 Given the
high number of individual claims typically brought in a mass tort
class action—over 50,000 in the Fen-Phen litigation, for example66—
the chance of a defendant declaring bankruptcy before all suits have
concluded is extraordinarily high. Therefore, if certification of a
prospective 23(b)(1) lawsuit fails, it can have significant implications
for the tort system’s administration of justice. Plaintiffs who file suit
quickly will be more assured of recovery regardless of the relative
merit of their claims, and plaintiffs whose injuries surface years later
might be deprived of any hope of recovery. Bankruptcy is a powerful
defense against slow-developing illnesses and will lead to a
substantially diminished recovery, and therefore under-deterrence,
for injuries with a delayed onset. Finally, any relaxation of 23(b)(1)’s
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); see Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356,
366–67 (1921); DAVID W. LOUISELL & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE:
STATE AND FEDERAL 719 (1962) (rephrasing this requirement as a consideration as to whether
“the possibility exists that [the] actor might be called upon to act in inconsistent ways”).
63. See Cauble, 255 U.S. at 356; Waybright v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp.
885 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); cf. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853). For similar cases in the
shareholders context, see Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Ames
v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.
1947); Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff’d, 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir.
1956); Goldberg v. Whittier Corp., 111 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951); Sobel v. Whittier Corp., 95 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mich.
1951), appeal dismissed, 195 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1952); Edgerton v. Armour & Co., 94 F. Supp.
549 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1949).
Finally, similar cases also arise in breach of trusts by fiduciaries that affect a large class of
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir.
1944); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1944); Boesenberg v. Chi. Title
& Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942); cf. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1944), rev’d on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966); cf.
Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
65. Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1102 (2012).
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions are relatively rare, due to the rule’s overlap with Rule 23(b)(2) actions.
Id. at 1101; see also Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Reagan, 509 F. Supp 1337 (D.D.C. 1981).
66. Fen-Phen Heart Valve Damage Lawsuit, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM, http://www
.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/fenphen.html#.U_yhrEsx_wJ (last updated Apr. 11, 2013).
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opt-out provision will permit defendants to trap plaintiffs in a class
action judgment or settlement that is not favorable to plaintiffs,
leading to a lesser overall recovery and therefore to under-deterrence.
b. 23(b)(2) Certification
Rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification where plaintiffs seek
injunctive relief applicable to the class as a whole. Unlike in 23(b)(3)
classes, plaintiffs in 23(b)(2) classes are not permitted to opt out.67
Traditionally, 23(b)(2) classes have been used most regularly in the
context of civil rights lawsuits,68 although they are not limited to
such cases.69 Injunctive relief may also be sought in the mass tort
context where the damage—say, a toxic spill—is ongoing.
Permitting plaintiffs to reap the benefits from a remedial injunction
while opting out and seeking additional damages could lead to overdeterrence; defendants would essentially face double punishment for
their wrongs.
c. 23(b)(3) Certification
Finally, a judge may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) so long
as common questions of law and fact “predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.”70 Rule 23(b)(3) acts as a catch-all for
67. Rule 23(b)(1) classes are generally considered mandatory classes, but the Second Circuit
has permitted Rule 23(b)(1)(B) opt-out at the discretion of district courts in a limited set of
circumstances. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
68. See, e.g., Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58–59 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that Rule
23(b)(2) “serves most frequently as the vehicle for civil rights actions and other institutional
reform cases that receive class action treatment”); see also Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.
1963); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963); Brunson v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No.
1, Clarendon City, S.C., 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962); Green v. Sch. Bd. of Roanoke, Va., 304
F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis, 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962);
Mannings v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Hillsborough Cty., Fla., 277 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1960);
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957); Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Frasier,
350 U.S. 979 (U.S.N.C. 1956).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. at 102 (describing
how Rule 23(b)(2) may be used by a class of purchasers alleging a seller’s improper price fixing,
or by patent licensees to test the legality of patent “tying” provisions). And, following Dukes, it is
unclear how feasible Rule 23(b)(2) certification is in even the civil rights context. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (holding 5-4 that commonality requirement was not
satisfied, and 9-0 that claims for backpay made certification under Rule 23(b)(2) inappropriate).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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instances in which a class action is called for but does not fall under
the specific circumstances described by (b)(1) or (b)(2). It requires
that prospective class members be given notice as well as an
opportunity to opt-out of the class. Although the latitude that Rule
23(b)(3) grants to judges to certify classes is great, its predominance
requirement is rigid. Therefore, even when “economies of time,
effort, and expense,” or concerns about the uniformity of decisions,
militate class certification, certification may only be granted where
predominance exists; the class action format cannot be used
pragmatically at the cost of compromising the rights of defendants or
plaintiffs.71
Permitting the certification of classes that do not meet Rule
23(b)(3)’s requirements will open the door to a more pragmatic use
of the class action. Although such pragmatic certification will
increase the efficiency of the court system, it may do so at the cost of
justice. For example, permitting certification where common
questions of law and fact do not predominate will bind both plaintiffs
and defendants to claims that substantially differ from those actually
litigated at trial. Moreover, if Rule 23(b)(3) is robbed of its opt-out or
notice provisions, it may lock plaintiffs into unfavorable decisions
and lead to under-deterrence of future wrongdoing.72 The high bar
for Rule 23(b)(3) certification implies a concern that group litigation
is susceptible to abuse, especially outside of the Rules 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) context.
3. Protecting a Class Under Rule 23
A number of Rule 23’s provisions expressly provide strict
judicial oversight of the class action, from class certification, to
settlement, to the final disbursement of the judgment. In particular,
Rule 23 ensures adequate attorney representation of plaintiffs
through Rules 23(a)(4),73 23(e)(2),74 23(g),75 and 23(h).76 Moreover,

71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. at 102; see Miller
v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., Inc.,
144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
72. This is much less of a concern for Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) actions, given the set of
circumstances to which they apply.
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (permitting class certification only where “the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
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the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) adds an additional level of
scrutiny; under CAFA, coupon settlements may be reviewed by an
independent expert preceding judicial approval, and lawyers must
take some of their payment in coupons.77
Plaintiffs, who typically are not repeat players in the tort system,
are uniquely vulnerable to the avarices not only of defense lawyers
but of unscrupulous plaintiffs’ attorneys.78 This vulnerability
presents a significant obstacle to the successful implementation of
tort law.79 Failing to fully enforce Rule 23’s protections will open the
door for dishonest plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek financial settlements
that avoid trial while maximizing their own contingency fees,
thereby not only robbing tort law of its compensatory function but
diminishing the overall rewards obtained. As even strong claims are
pushed towards settlement, defendants may escape their wrongs
relatively unscathed, happily passing the externalities of their
negligence to plaintiffs and society as a whole.
Rule 23 protects against the strong financial incentives
motivating plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle even when settlement is not in
their clients’ best interest.80 Therefore, although the financial
incentives of class action settlements do not always encourage an
optimal resolution for plaintiffs, the strict regulatory requirements
surrounding settlements provide substantial tools for the judiciary to
check untoward practices. Settlements may still be an imperfect
solution for defendants and plaintiffs alike, but because of this

74. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (permitting a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise
that binds class members only “after a [court] hearing and on a [court] finding that it is fair,
reasonable, and adequate”).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (setting forth rules for a court’s appointment of class counsel,
including the requirement that the court “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s
ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class”).
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (limiting the award of attorney’s fees to only those fees that are
“reasonable”).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (2012).
78. For examples of strong court oversight of settlements, see In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec.
Litig., 965 F. Supp 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1997); In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257
(N.D. Cal. 1996); see also In re Telesphere Int’l Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Cunningham v. Abbott, Nos. 2007-CA-001971-MR, 2007-CA-001981-MR, 2007-CA-002173MR, 2007-CA-2174-MR, 2011 WL 336459 (Ky. App. Feb. 4, 2011). Courts do not, however,
always provide such vigorous oversight.
79. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 8, at 886.
80. See Engstrom, supra note 49, at 365 n.8.
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formalized judicial supervision, they remain a palatable solution
nevertheless.
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF RULE 23
A. The Rise of Rule 23
Although Rule 23’s structural protections are important to the
successful resolution of many mass torts,81 Rule 23 class certification
has not always been an option for mass tort litigators. Rather, the
Advisory Committee to the 1966 revision of Rule 23 made it clear
that Rule 23 was not intended for mass torts.82 In an advisory note,
the Committee explained that “[a] ‘mass accident’ resulting in
injuries to numerous people is ordinarily not appropriate for a class
action”; the likelihood that significant questions of damages,
liability, and defenses to liability would affect parties differently was
too great.83 Mass accidents were reasonably uncommon in 1966 and
rarely resulted in a large number of separate trials. Thus, for the 1966
Committee, which saw little need for mass tort class certification,
this appeared to be an appropriate balance to strike.84 For over a
decade, courts followed the Committee’s expressed intent, denying
class certification in the mass tort context.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, courts increasingly certified
Rule 23 class actions for mass torts, even where they had previously
denied certification.85 In 1984, Judge Weinstein certified what was
then the largest class to date in the Agent Orange litigation, citing, as
justification, the many challenges inherent to mass torts that would
inevitably cripple individual Agent Orange lawsuits.86 In the
81. See supra Part II.C.
82. The 1966 revisions created the modern version of Rule 23; see Yeazell, supra note 9, at
237; see also Engstrom, supra note 49, at 324.
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
84. See Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF.
L. REV. 433 (1960) (cited favorably by the Advisory Committee’s Article to Proposed Rule of
Civil Procedure) (describing, also, how contingency fees “insure[] effective legal service for any
injured person who wants a lawyer”).
85. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 24–25 (2000) (describing, as notable, the Agent Orange certification,
the Fifth Circuit’s first ever upholding of an asbestos class certification, and a surprising Sixth
Circuit reversal of its previous denial of class certification for personal injury claims).
86. Id.; In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747–48 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(indicating that the difficulty of proof in the mass-tort context, issues surrounding the “Statute of
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following year, the Fifth Circuit for the first time upheld an asbestos
class certification.87 The class certification floodgates appeared ready
to open, and by the late 1980s class certification was no longer
uncommon in the mass tort context.88 This looming jurisprudential
shift arrived not a moment too soon; mass accidents of the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s had created a crushing burden on the judiciary.89
Although a complete list of products spurring mass actions
during these decades would stretch for pages, much of the increase in
litigation resulted from a single substance: asbestos. The judicial
system was ill-equipped to handle the ongoing asbestos tragedy.
Millions of potential plaintiffs were exposed to dozens of asbestos
manufacturers’ products, leading to billions of dollars of present and
future damages.90 Many of those exposed have still not yet
developed symptoms,91 and given the ubiquity of asbestos’
distribution, few potential plaintiffs can definitively indicate which
specific manufacturers’ asbestos caused their illness. However,
plaintiffs’ lawyers were able to overcome much of the uncertainty
surrounding proof and degree of exposure by combining huge
numbers of plaintiffs into classes. Plaintiffs’ lawyers highlighted
those claims most suited for the modern rules of litigation and
therefore provided recovery for plaintiffs who were undoubtedly
injured by some of defendants’ products, but who would not have
had as strong claims if brought individually. This is not to say that
asbestos claims are not also individually sustainable: they often are.
Limitations and Failure to Determine Who Was Harmed and Who Caused Harm[,]” are but a few
of the “legal problems posing major obstacles to plaintiffs’ recovery”).
87. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986) (expressing concern
that courts will be “ill-equipped to handle this ‘avalanche of litigation’” (citation omitted)).
88. See HENSLER, supra note 85, at 24–25 (describing many of these certifications,
including a surprising Sixth Circuit reversal of its previous denial of class certification for
personal injury claims).
89. For a critical perspective on this litigation, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98
F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984); Coffee,
supra note 8 (building on his earlier work and calling into question the value of such class actions
to plaintiffs); Macey & Miller, supra note 8 (proposing revisions in the regulatory system in the
context of a discussion of the entrepreneurial attorney).
90. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION
92 (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND
_MG162.pdf (estimating that the costs of asbestos litigation, including litigation costs and
settlement and judgment values, totaled over $70 billion through 2002).
91. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1 (1986) (originally published in 1986) (noting that
asbestosis “symptoms normally take at least 10, and usually 20 or more, years to develop”).
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But those infirmities that are endemic to asbestos claims, such as the
challenge of proving causation and responsibility, are largely
palliated by the class action structure.
Even given the powerful incentives to group asbestos suits, the
widespread harm caused by asbestos led to a flood of individually
filed claims. From the time that the public became aware of the harm
caused by asbestos in the 1970s,92 the quantity of asbestos-related
litigation grew exponentially. In the mid-1980s, asbestos litigation
alone accounted for a significant percentage of civil filings in a
number of jurisdictions.93 For example, by 1990, one-third of all civil
cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas were asbestos personal
injury claims.94 Courts and defendants alike were overwhelmed by
these claims, welcoming class certification as a means of efficiently
resolving these conflicts and effectively assuring finality. Plaintiffs’
lawyers increasingly filed class certification motions to resolve not
just asbestos but other mass torts.95
As the 1966 Advisory Committee’s remonstration against class
certification for mass accidents grew more distant, the burden that
mass torts placed on the court system multiplied. Plaintiffs’ and
defense lawyers alike supported class certification, and courts were
becoming all too willing to oblige. Facing an onslaught of claims in
the waning years of the twentieth century, district courts took
advantage of new, less literal readings of Rule 23, devising “creative
class structures to forge mass settlements.”96 Again and again, mass
tort class actions were certified—largely for the purpose of seeking
settlement—as district courts responded to crises caused by asbestos,
Agent Orange, Bendectin, Fen-Phen, and the dozens of other large92. Asbestos’ toxicity was discovered in 1906, and evidence linking asbestos to various lung
diseases grew through the first decades of the twentieth century. James L. Stengel, The Asbestos
End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 227 (2006); Asbestos, AM. CANCER SOC’Y
(2010),
http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/CancerCauses/OtherCarcinogens/Pollution/asbestos
?sitearea=PE; 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 73 (1996). Yet, it was not until the 1960s that the United
States public awoke to asbestos’ dangers, and the substance’s use was curtailed in new
construction. Id. At this point, it was too late; asbestos was present in schoolhouses, office
buildings, and countless products used daily by millions of Americans nationwide. Id.
93. See Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 14, at 1900.
94. Id.
95. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 885–86 (describing how lawyers may have flocked too
quickly to mass torts such as the Agent Orange, Bhopal, and Dalkon Shield litigations, collecting
clients at an impossibly fast rate).
96. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 327.
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scale injuries caused by mass production and an increasingly
globalized supply chain, wherein a single defect in a product can lead
to millions of illnesses or injuries.97
B. The Fall of Mass Tort Class Action Settlements
But as soon as the era of mass tort class actions appeared ready
to begin, it came crashing to an end. In Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor98 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,99 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 23, holding that
irrespective of society’s need for relaxed class certification
standards, Rule 23 must be read as the Committee intended:
narrowly.100
1. Amchem Restricts Rule 23(a)
In Amchem, a global, settlement-only class had been certified by
Judge Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a suit against
twenty former asbestos manufacturers (known as the “CCR”).101 All
prospective class members sought recovery for injuries due to
asbestos exposure. Prospective class members complained of a range
of differing levels of exposure to asbestos, an inherent characteristic
of asbestos and other mass tort claims. Although a number of district
judges had certified broad classes,102 as was common in the mass tort
context, the Third Circuit denied certification, noting that the
proposed class members had been “exposed to different asbestoscontaining products, in different ways, over different periods, and for

97. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1998) (Bendectin); MUNDY, supra note 4 (Fen-Phen);
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
(enlarged ed. 1987) (Agent Orange); see also MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH
OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996) (breast implants);
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)
(asbestos).
98. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
99. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
100. Amchem and Ortiz were but the first of a number of Supreme Court opinions to limit
Rule 23. Because Amchem and Ortiz involved the same sort of mass torts discussed in this
Article, this Part focuses on these two cases.
101. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
102. See Jody L. Gallegos, Three Decades of Frustration: Finally, A Solution to the Asbestos
Problem, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 61, 72–73 (2000) (describing the history of asbestos
class certification leading up to Amchem and Ortiz).
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different amounts of time.”103 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and agreed: “Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity . . . and
applied with the interests of absent class members in close view,
cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District
Court heaped upon it.”104 It mattered little that plaintiffs and
defendants only had requested class certification for the purpose of
reaching a settlement. Notwithstanding the importance and
complexity of asbestos litigation,105 Rule 23 “demand[s] undiluted,
even heightened, attention in the settlement context.”106 Thus, rather
than allowing a relaxed application of Rule 23 for mass tort class
action settlements, the Supreme Court reasserted the Advisory
Commission’s admonition that the Rule was not appropriate for mass
torts.
This holding threw the mass tort world into disarray. Plaintiffs
in modern mass torts usually have been exposed to defendants’
products in different ways and for varying lengths of time.107
Moreover, asbestos litigation was far from the most problematic
category of mass tort; asbestos’ causation of asbestosis, as well as of
many cancers,108 was well-established, and therefore what is
normally a substantial challenge in the mass-tort context was not
significantly at issue.109 The Supreme Court sent a clear message
with Amchem: no flexibility could be read into the Rule 23(a) class
requirements, even if a strict reading of these requirements meant
that few mass tort classes could be certified.
2. Ortiz Restricts Rule 23(b)
Two years later, the Supreme Court once again refused to bend
the rigid class certification requirements and invalidated a Rule

103. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 609.
104. Id. at 629.
105. These dual points were emphasized by Justice Breyer in a separate opinion. Id. at 630–
31.
106. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
107. See Noah Smith-Drelich, The Specific Causation Paradox (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the author).
108. Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov
/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last updated May 1, 2009) (noting that asbestos has been
classified as a “known human carcinogen” by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services).
109. See Smith-Drelich, supra note 107.
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23(b)(1)(B) asbestos certification.110 As in Amchem, at issue in Ortiz
was the level of discretion afforded to district courts when
interpreting Rule 23’s requirements, specifically in the context of
mass tort litigation. The district court in Ortiz recognized that the
defendant, Fibreboard, was being slowly forced into bankruptcy by
the litigation, and relaxed 23(b)(1)(B)’s historical limited fund
criteria so as to give “the class as a whole . . . the best deal” by
allowing Fibreboard “to remain a working enterprise.”111 As in
Amchem, however, differences within the class—of the sort inherent
to mass tort class actions—raised the possibility that there were
conflicts of interest within the class. Once again, the Supreme Court
insisted that the Rule 23 requirements must be strictly applied, even
if it precluded certification of mass tort classes.
Thus, first in Amchem and then in Ortiz, the Supreme Court
“rejected a massive asbestos class action settlement for failing to
comport with the requirements of Rule 23 despite claims that the
settlement was not only necessary but also substantively and
procedurally fair, if not the best that could be achieved.”112 Little
question was left as to the future of mass tort class action
settlements. The “elephantine mass” of mass torts could not be
unraveled within the class action regulatory framework, not even “to
avoid delay and expense so great as to bring about a massive denial
of justice.”113 Although mass tort class actions can be certified after
Amchem and Ortiz, they rarely are.
IV. MASS TORTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
AMCHEM AND ORTIZ
Deprived of the option of class certification, mass tort defense
and plaintiffs’ attorneys alike are faced with a choice: either they can
litigate tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of cases individually in the
court system, or they may look outside the current regulatory
110. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
111. Id. at 882–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. George M Cohen, The “Fair” Is the Enemy of the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corporation and Class Action Settlements, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 23, 25 (2000). Amchem and
Ortiz have been followed by Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011). While Dukes was not a mass-torts case, in Dukes the Supreme Court once again insisted
on a restricted reading of Rule 23’s requirements, even when such a narrow construction had the
effect of making certification in cases similar to Dukes difficult. Id.
113. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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framework for justice. In this context, the emergence of private,
contract-driven settlements like the Vioxx Agreement was
inevitable.114
A. Settlements and the Vioxx Agreement
Amchem and Ortiz made the certification of large classes
difficult for the resolution of mass torts. In fact, according to a study
released in the aftermath of Amchem and Ortiz, only 22 percent of
class actions removed to federal court were ultimately certified.115 As
predicted, courts have been especially skeptical when faced with
consumer product classes.116 Interestingly, although state courts have
been perceived as more receptive to certifying nationwide class
actions,117 state courts do not certify classes at a significantly higher
rate than federal courts.118 This is because many state courts follow
Amchem, and because of the effects of CAFA, which “expanded
Amchem’s limitation of judicial regulation” by diminishing the
impact of certification-friendly state jurisdictions.119
114. The exception to this rule is MDL No. 875, a multidistrict litigation created in 1991 by
the JPML to manage the asbestos personal injury and wrongful death cases. About MDL 875,
U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR E. DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.paed.uscourts.gov
/mdl875a.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). The MDL has had over 121,000 cases transferred to it,
and has settled, dismissed, or remanded over 108,000 of those cases. Id.; see also Multi-District
Litigation Funding, RD LEGAL FUNDING, http://www.legalfunding.com/eligible-cases/multi
-district-litigation-funding/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (providing statistics). However, the rate at
which asbestos claims have been resolved—an average of over 4,000 each day, Aricka Flowers,
MDL Judge Could Change the Game of Asbestos Litigation, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC.
(Apr. 17, 2009),
http://setexasrecord.com/news/220607-mdl-judge-could-change-the-game-of
-asbestos-litigation—should raise questions about whether the MDL is sacrificing justice in the
name of efficiency.
115. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 605 (2006).
But see BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EFFECTS OF AMCHEM/ORTIZ ON
THE FILING OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/AmChem.pdf/$file/
AmChem.pdf (finding an increase in the filing of class actions following Ortiz).
116. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting
that the Ninth Circuit “has recognized the potential difficulties of ‘commonality’ and
‘management’ inherent in certifying products liability class actions”); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc.,
75 F.3d 1069, 1081 (6th Cir. 1996) (commenting that, after Amchem and Ortiz, products liability
classes present challenges for certification because they usually involve factual and legal issues
that vary from individual to individual).
117. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–15.
118. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 115, at 599.
119. See Alec Johnson, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief: The Policy Implications of
Limiting Courts’ Regulatory Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
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Thus, after Amchem and Ortiz, few litigants were able to take
advantage of Rule 23 in crafting their settlements. Enter Vioxx. A
pain medication shown to substantially increase heart attack and
stroke risk, Vioxx may have caused up to 160,000 cases of heart
attacks and strokes before it was pulled from the market.120 However,
because the detrimental health effects of Vioxx were exclusively
short-term, the number of potential plaintiffs was finite.121 Although
a motion for class certification was filed shortly after Vioxx’s
withdrawal, it was denied.122 In denying class certification, Judge
Fallon cited “‘a vast number of different persons, who took different
dosages of Vioxx, at different times’ and who suffered widely
different injuries from their exposure.”123
In the absence of class certification, the resulting flood of
individual suits filed was massive, “spanning six years and involving
the production of over 50 million pages of documents and the taking
of more than 2,000 depositions.”124 Defending these suits cost
Merck, Vioxx’s manufacturer, $1 million a day, according to press
reports.125
Moreover, despite winning eleven out of the eighteen
“bellwether” trials filed, Merck, facing high punitive damages, was
eager to settle. Plaintiffs, too, sought resolution of their cases through
settlement. Ironically, even while the evidence strongly supported
plaintiffs’ general claim that Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes,
plaintiffs found it difficult to prove specific causation, “that this
Vioxx caused this stroke.”126 And the Supreme Court had recently
granted certiorari in Wyeth v. Levine,127 which involved the
preemption of drug company liability by FDA approval, leaving
many plaintiffs’ lawyers concerned that the Court was “on the verge
of adopting a strong preemption position that would leave plaintiffs
REV. 1039, 1074–76 (2008) (describing the impact of Amchem and Ortiz on nationwide class
actions). For a complete discussion of how CAFA affects this reform, see id.
120. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 370 (describing a later, independent study completed by Dr.
Eric Topol and published in the New England Journal of Medicine).
121. Id. at 369–70.
122. Id. at 370. Given Amchem and Ortiz, this denial was thoroughly unsurprising.
123. Id. at 370–71 (quoting Judge Fallon’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for class certification).
124. Id. at 371.
125. Id. Ultimately, the costs of defending Vioxx totaled over $1 billion. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis in original).
127. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
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empty-handed.”128 Thus, the Vioxx litigation was an ideal vehicle for
an innovative settlement mechanism: everybody wanted to settle.
Merck’s announcement of a $4.85 billion settlement agreement in
November 2007 was a welcome relief to plaintiffs’ and defense
attorneys alike, as well as the overburdened courts. This settlement
bought Merck finality at a relative discount,129 while providing
individual plaintiffs certain remediation for their injuries—which
was more than what individual litigation could offer.
This settlement was not a Rule 23 class action settlement, but
rather a private contractual agreement made between Merck and the
plaintiffs’ attorneys who represented multiple Vioxx-injured
plaintiffs. Strikingly, the Agreement required these plaintiffs’
attorneys to recommend settlement to each of their Vioxx clients if
any one of their clients signed onto the settlement. Moreover, for any
client who decided not to participate in the settlement, the signatory
law firms promised “‘to the extent permitted’ by applicable strictures
of legal ethics, ‘to disengage . . . from the representation’ of any such
dissenting client.”130 Put simply, a lawyer could “recommend the
settlement to all of her eligible clients or to none of them.”131 Before
determining whether to recommend enrollment in the program, an
enrolling attorney also agreed to exercise his or her independent
judgment in the best interest of each client individually.132 Settlement
amounts were determined by a point system, through which plaintiffs
deemed eligible for compensation—not all were—were assigned
points based on a combination of factors seeking to approximate the
strength and value of the plaintiff’s case. For example, the severity of
the plaintiff’s injury, the length of time the plaintiff took Vioxx, the
proximity between the injury and the plaintiff’s Vioxx use, and the
plaintiff’s personal risk factors were taken into account.133 Awards
128. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 371. The Supreme Court did not adopt such a position,
instead holding 6-3 that the FDA’s approval of the medication did not shield Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals from state law liability. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). The holding was
announced nearly two years after the Vioxx agreement.
129. Financial analysts predicted that the cases were worth up to $25 billion. A Lot at Stake
for Merck in Vioxx Suits, CNN MONEY (Jul. 12, 2005, 10:27 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005
/07/11/news/fortune500/vioxx/index.htm.
130. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 372 (quoting settlement agreement).
131. Id. at 372–73.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., id. at 373–74.

MASS TORT

34

4/21/2015 9:51 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

were determined by taking the total points of all claimants and
dividing it by the settlement plot. Finally, Merck retained the right to
withdraw from the settlement if fewer than 85 percent of the
plaintiffs agreed to it. The entire Agreement provided for oversight
by Judge Fallon, who agreed to lend his experience and the weight of
his office toward ensuring a successful settlement; although, in doing
so he was serving as the “Chief Administrator” of the settlement,
rather than as a Rule 23 judge.134 Notably, Judge Fallon was granted
significant authority to ensure that the terms of the Agreement were
not “prohibited or unenforceable to any extent.”135 Judge Fallon did
not, however, have the use of the full panoply of his judicial powers,
such as contempt, to do so.
The Agreement was not bound by class action restrictions, but
its terms in large part replicate those found in class action
settlements.136 Why, if they were free to avoid the risk and burden of
judicial oversight, did the Agreement’s drafters nevertheless give
Judge Fallon “broad power?”137 Although including such assurances
of fairness likely sweetened the settlement deal for plaintiffs, Judge
Fallon’s involvement also served a crucial legal function: a sitting
judge’s acceptance of the contract’s terms gave the Agreement
legitimacy and mitigated what ethical concerns otherwise might have
kneecapped the Agreement.
And there were no small number of potential ethical violations
associated with the Agreement. Leading ethicists have raised
numerous objections to the terms of the Agreement.138 In particular,
Rule 1.16(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits

134. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the
Signature Pages Hereto §§ 9.2.4, 9.2.5, 16.4.2 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://cdn.levinlaw
.com/pdf/Vioxx-Master-Settlement-Agreement.pdf.
135. Id. § 16.4.2; see also id. §§ 9.2.4, 9.2.5.
136. See, for example, the terms of the Dow Corning breast-cancer settlement described in
ANGELL, supra note 97, at 194.
137. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 373.
138. See Mark Donald, Plaintiffs Counsel Disagree Over Ethical Duties in Vioxx Settlement,
23 TEXAS LAWYER 1 (2007); Erichson, supra note 14, at 1002; Johnson, supra note 119, at 1088;
see also Alex Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settlement Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2007, at C4; Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer’s Loyalty, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/us/22bar.html; Antitrust Objection to
Vioxx Settlement, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Jan. 23, 2008), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com
/2008/01/antitrust-objection-to-vioxx-settlement.html (describing the ethical problems raised by
Professor George Cohen of Virginia, “a particularly vocal critic of the settlement”).
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attorneys from withdrawing from representation for an improper
reason.139 The Agreement, however, required signatory lawyers to
withdraw from representing any client who did not wish to settle
with Merck—which is not a proper reason for withdrawal.140 Model
Rule 1.2(a) requires that attorneys abide by their clients’ decisions,141
yet the Agreement was made between Merck and the lawyers, and
restricted the lawyers’ ability to respond to client concerns.
Specifically, the Agreement sought to eliminate the opt-out problem
typical to class action settlements; in class action settlements, it is not
uncommon for lawyers to encourage those clients with the strongest
suits to opt out of the settlement, leaving only those class members
with weak claims bound by the terms of the settlement. The
Agreement successfully prevented participating lawyers from opting
out clients with especially strong claims and less than 1 percent of
plaintiffs ultimately opted out.142 Moreover, Rule 2.1 of the Model
Rules requires attorneys to exercise independent judgment,143 but the
Agreement effectively forces attorneys to treat all of their clients as
one. Finally, Rule 5.6 prohibits agreements that improperly restrict
the lawyer’s right to practice.144 The Agreement seeks to do just that
through its coercive, all-or-nothing provisions. Although many of the
attorney signatories likely did not have their decisions constrained by
the Agreement’s terms, the Agreement would not have succeeded
had it not effectively restricted some of the attorneys who were party
to its terms.
Thus, although the Vioxx Agreement appeared to replicate Rule
23, conspicuously absent from its terms was anything approximating
23(a)(4), 23(e)(2), or 23(g): the fail-safes for attorney misconduct.
Substantially compounding this problem was the Agreement’s strong

139. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
140. That this requirement included the caveat that no lawyer should violate legal ethics in
withdrawing from representation is somewhat of an empty assurance; it is a stretch to accept that
the Agreement’s terms can be a proper reason for withdrawing, and, thus, any lawyer who
followed the Agreement’s urging and withdrew may have committed a per se violation of this
ethical rule. See Antitrust Objection to Vioxx Settlement, supra note 138.
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (2011).
142. See Merck Argues Vioxx Case Before U.S. Supreme Court, MERCK.COM (Nov. 30,
2009), http://www.merck.com/newsroom/news-release-archive/corporate/2009_1130.html (citing
that 99 percent of eligible parties enrolled in the settlement).
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (2011).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (2011).
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discouragement of plaintiffs opting out; although the Vioxx
Agreement addressed a class best encapsulated by 23(b)(3), it took
its lead from the 23(b)(2) mandatory classes. The Vioxx Agreement
drafters could thus craft a class favorable to defendants without
worrying that its strongest members would opt out and sue
separately. Plaintiffs were trapped in an unfavorable class,
represented by attorneys who appeared, at times, more accountable
to Merck than to their own clients.145
Although the structural problems inherent in the Vioxx
Agreement were not immediately apparent—this is the first Article
to cast light on the Agreement’s ingenious mimicry of Rule 23—the
numerous ethical questions were. And yet, only one state’s ethics
board issued an opinion on the subject146—an informal opinion that
appears unlikely to have had any impact on the overall number of
signatories to the Agreement: over 99 percent of plaintiffs ultimately
took part in the settlement.147 Judge Fallon’s involvement in the
Agreement appears to have given it a sufficient degree of legitimacy
to clear its ethical hurdles. The vast majority of settlement payments
have been disbursed, and yet no lawyers have faced any sort of
reprimand or sanction, let alone disbarment, for their participation.
This is the future of mass tort settlements.148 After Amchem and
Ortiz, few mass tort prospective classes will meet the rigid Rule 23
requirements for certification. Yet plaintiffs, defendants, and the
court system alike all need an efficient model for settlement of these
claims. The Vioxx Agreement presents exactly such a model, solving
the apparent conflict of maintaining a healthy settlement class
without suffering a loss of propriety. Although it was not the first
non-class aggregate settlement, the Agreement’s particular
contingencies ensured a remarkable degree of all-or-nothing
compliance. By contracting with plaintiffs’ attorneys, the defense
ensured that all cases, and not merely the weakest ones, were
145. See, e.g., Donald, supra note 138.
146. Conn. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008), available at
http://forctlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/08-01-final-signed.pdf.
147. Merck Argues Vioxx Case Before U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 142.
148. This may also be the future of workplace discrimination settlements; the Vioxx model
need not be limited to the mass-tort context. There is nothing stopping an employer like
Wal-Mart, eager to escape the bad publicity that accompanies workplace discrimination suits,
from similarly contracting with plaintiffs’ attorneys to quiet even those claims that appear no
longer viable as class actions.
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included in the settlement. And although this crucial provision raised
serious ethical concerns, by voluntarily building in many of the
protections required by class action law—pseudo-judicial oversight
in particular—the agreement passed, if not bypassed, ethical
scrutiny.
B. The (Non-)Deterrence of Vioxx Agreements
The success of the Vioxx Agreement indicates that the question
of “how to legitimize the mechanism of coercion in the advancement
of peace” can be answered: by “driving peacemaking toward . . .
private contract”149—so long, at least, as that contract locks all
plaintiffs and their lawyers into the agreement. Other “Vioxx
Agreements”150 may make use of a variety of alternative, creative
provisions, but it is not difficult to begin to imagine how they might
be structured.151 One particularly damaging condition of the Vioxx
Agreement—its insistence that plaintiffs’ lawyers recommend the
deal to their clients and to withdraw if any client declines—is sure to
be replicated in future non-class action mass settlement agreements,
at least where plaintiffs have no hope of becoming a certified class.
Without fear of a viable class action lawsuit, savvy defense attorneys
will implement lock-in provisions with greater and greater
frequency, knowing that with the right incentive, many plaintiffs’
attorneys will gladly abandon the less-attractive proposition of filing
hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits. Ironically, as such
contractual agreements relieve the stress of mass torts on the judicial
system, calls for reform of Rule 23 will gradually diminish.
The implications of placing mass tort justice into the calloused
hands of the market are serious. When Rule 23 classes—even
settlement-only classes—provide at least a potential basis for
settlement, plaintiffs have some assurance that Rule 23’s protections
and oversight will limit any abuses by either defendants or plaintiffs’
lawyers. Should defendants deviate far from Rule 23 in creating non149. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 388.
150. In future references, this Article will use the phrase “Vioxx Agreements” to refer to any
such non-class mass settlement that effectively locks plaintiffs’ lawyers and plaintiffs into the
settlement group.
151. The Vioxx settlement, with a fixed group of plaintiffs, was in many ways an especially
easy case to settle. Future mass-tort settlements may require additional provisions, partially
replicating Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or other portions of the class action rule.
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class aggregate settlements that undermine the adversarial process,
plaintiffs and their more-responsible lawyers will have the safety of
Rule 23 to fall back on. Without even so much of a threat of a class
action lawsuit, however, defendants have less incentive to stay
within Rule 23’s bounds in crafting settlements maximally favorable
to their interests—and plaintiffs’ lawyers will be less able or less
willing to effectively combat such settlements. The consequences of
such unbound settlements may be serious.
First, problems inherent in the lack of Rule 23(a)’s numerosity-,
commonality-, typicality-, or adequacy-of-representation-checks are
likely to arise. Defendants will prefer to achieve the broadest
arrangements possible and can strategically propose settlements built
around their own weak “class” of plaintiffs. Those plaintiffs thrust to
the forefront of negotiations may not necessarily have claims typical
of the “class” they represent, and lawyers acting on behalf of the
“class” will no longer be restrained by Rule 23’s oversight to
represent the whole “class” adequately. Without judicial enforcement
of Rule 23(a)’s checks, defendants will be free to buy finality from
disreputable plaintiffs’ lawyers with as broad and as weak of a group
of plaintiffs as possible.152 And, in so buying-off the plaintiffs bar,
defendants may effectively foreclose the possibility of later strong
suits emerging—all at a relative pittance. Given the information
asymmetries inherent to mass tort actions, this could have serious
access-to-justice implications. Moreover, from a societal perspective,
defense attorneys’ ability to strategically avoid or diminish Rule
23(a)’s protections will lead to smaller settlement awards and
systemic under-deterrence of future harm.
Second, as defendants become more creative in crafting these
arrangements, agreements will emerge with terms that do not mirror
Rule 23(b). Defendants may choose to structure agreements that
provide inadequate notice or effectively do not permit plaintiffs to
opt out (just as the Vioxx Agreement did not). This, too, will lead to
smaller total recoveries for plaintiffs and systemic under-deterrence,
as plaintiffs with strong individual suits who would have opted out if
they had been given notice or an opportunity will be grouped in the
152. See Slater, supra note 54. Although it is possible that plaintiffs’ lawyers can be similarly
“bought off” in the Rule 23 context, the incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to agree to such
ethically marginal arrangements is substantially diminished when a viable alternative exists.
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settlement agreement and prevented from seeking any additional
remedy.
Third, absent the protection of Rules 23(a), (e)(2), or (g),
plaintiffs will lack the assurance that their individual interests will be
represented. Not even the Vioxx Agreement provided plaintiffs with
protection from their own attorneys, other than an admonition that
attorneys should follow their ethical obligations. Thus, the Vioxx
plaintiffs’ attorneys were free to negotiate settlement awards that
benefited their own interests over those of their clients. The very
structure of the Agreement itself ensured that not all plaintiffs would
be adequately represented, yet a sitting judge acting in a semi-private
capacity did nothing to intervene.153 The powerful financial
incentives driving plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle quickly will likely
lead to substantial under-deterrence in the absence of formal judicial
oversight.154
Fourth, a proliferation of Vioxx Agreements will put immense
pressure on the judges who administer these Agreements. Such
additional, non-statutorily-imposed duties could change the nature of
the judiciary. Given the unique situations and novel contractual
provisions that will begin to emerge, judicial resources may be taxed
merely by virtue of judges’ learning curve for each new complicated
agreement. Furthermore, even as these agreements proffer oversight
to judges with one hand, they will take away judicial control with the
other. Pre-settlement negotiations often influence, if not determine,
the eventual settlement reached, and they are overseen by judges in
cases brought before the court—but no such oversight is necessarily
provided for by extra-judicial contractual arrangements. Similarly,
most judges actively manage cases in their dockets, intervening if it
appears that one party’s counsel is not adequately acting on behalf of
that party’s interests, or if some other injustice has occurred. There
are also additional mechanisms of judicial control provided by rule,

153. In fact, Judge Fallon went on the record to describe the settlement as fair and adequate.
Although Judge Fallon’s oversight may have been similarly ineffective in the Rule 23 context,
plaintiffs would have then at least had the recourse of appealing his Rule 23 judgment on the
basis that he had failed to adequately enforce Rule 23—an option not available to aggrieved
Vioxx Agreement signatories (who could not appeal Judge Fallon’s failure to follow Rule 23 as
the settlement was not bound by Rule 23).
154. See supra Part II.
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including oversight of lawyer fees155 and coupon settlements,156 and
the latitude to reject unfair settlements.157 None of these are
guaranteed by Vioxx Agreements. Thus, more broadly inclusive
settlements—and therefore under-deterrence—should be expected to
arise along with these non-Rule 23 settlements.
Finally, economic theory predicts that individual plaintiffs, less
able to bear the risk of trial and thus more eager to settle, will be
disadvantaged in settlement negotiations.158 In the context of class
action litigation, much of this disadvantage is mitigated by the threat
of a class action trial, which gives plaintiffs collectively a bargaining
chip they otherwise would not individually possess. Here, where
Ortiz and Amchem limit class certification, plaintiffs no longer can
make this powerful threat: a plaintiff must either accept a defendant’s
offer or sue as an individual. Thus, the lack of a credible class action
threat gives defendants an advantage additional to the procedural
advantages that defendants gain by circumventing Rule 23. This will
result in smaller settlement totals for plaintiffs, and also the chipping
away of individual liberties normally protected by regulation, as such
agreements increasingly push the ethical envelope.
Although judges will continue to be involved in these private
contractual settlements so as to alleviate ethical concerns, without the
formal protection of Rule 23 and CAFA, defendants are likely to
structure these agreements so as to allow themselves greater leeway
than would be permitted by the current regulatory framework. Judges
play a critical role in checking the destructive cross-incentives
affecting plaintiffs’ attorneys that would otherwise undermine justice
and fairness in class action settlements. Including judicial oversight
only to the extent desired by defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers will
ensure that plaintiffs—the parties most in need of judicial
protection—receive the short end of the stick in settlement
negotiations. This will result in not only a substantial loss of plaintiff

155. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006).
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Also, the absence of objectors in Vioxx agreements, id., removes yet
another check on the fairness of Rule 23 settlements.
158. Cf., e.g., Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 105
F.R.D. 251, 290 (1984). (“The plain fact is that, with very rare exceptions, in our culture, parties
who are disadvantaged in litigation are even more disadvantaged in alternative-dispute-resolution
settings when the courts are closed to them.”).
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autonomy but in the systemic under-deterrence of future defendant
misbehavior.
Most of these factors are present, to some extent, in any nonclass aggregate settlement. Without the threat of a viable Rule 23
class, however, defendants have far more leeway to achieve
settlements that favor their interests. The Vioxx Agreement, and its
all-or-nothing lock-in provisions, is evidence of how defendants can
take advantage of non-class settlement structures in circumstances
where no Rule 23 class is viable.
V. WE NEED NOT “SETTLE” FOR VIOXX AGREEMENTS
Fortunately, there are several possible resolutions to this
looming problem. One is to turn to the parties responsible for
approving these arrangements for help: judges. By refusing to
participate as administrator of Vioxx Agreements, judges would
avoid lending legitimacy to these problematic arrangements.159 Even
judges who are not personally involved in administrating settlement
agreements could help by refusing to enforce settlement contracts
with problematic clauses. Such actions would help stem the damage
from Vioxx Agreements. But they do not present a panacea: without
broader systemic changes, untoward settlement practices would
likely continue outside of the occasional settlement-unfriendly
district.
Another option is to look to the rulemakers for change. A
legislative solution could help provide that needed systemic change
and prevent the injustice and under-deterrence that will accompany a
proliferation of Vioxx Agreements. Doing so, however, risks
disturbing the Rules’ careful calibration of the interests of plaintiffs,
defendants, and society, not to mention the balancing of efficiency
and justiciability inherent in Rule 23. More crucially, legislative
reform requires a legislature willing and able to act. Given the
current political climate of inaction, a legislative solution
unfortunately thus remains a long shot.
159. And it bears repeating: judges should not participate in such arrangements. Any judge
who participates in her official capacity may be participating in coercing settlement, in violation
of Canon 3(A)(5) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and its accompanying
commentary. A judge who acts in her unofficial capacity may be moonlighting as a private
arbitrator in violation of Canon 4(A)(4) or as an administrator in violation of Canon 4(E). Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges Canon 3(A)(4)–(5), 4(E) (2003).
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There is another broad-sweeping solution on hand, one that does
not rely on the slow-moving and overly-politicized involvement of
legislators: jurisdictions can attain closer-to-optimal mass tort
deterrence, even in the absence of permissive class certification, by
aggressively sanctioning the plaintiffs’ attorneys who do not act in
the best interests of their clients in settling outside of Rule 23’s
protections.160 And unlike a change brought about by individual
judges’ refusal to participate in Vioxx Agreements, a sanction-based
solution may be accomplished in just one or two fell swoops: it is the
threat of reprimand, sanction, or disbarment that will serve as a
substantial counterweight to the financial incentives driving
plaintiffs’ lawyers to fail to act in the best interest of their clients.
Thus, sanctions need only be threatened in a small handful of highprofile instances to effect a change in the settlement of non-class
mass actions. Ethics regulators and public interest groups need only
see judicial involvement in non-class mass settlement for what it is—
defendants’ clever attempt to cloak problematic arrangements in the
shroud of the judge’s legitimacy—and actively pursue those ethics
violations that will necessarily accompany the new generation of
Vioxx Agreements.
The remainder of this Article will discuss this proposal.161 Part
V begins by outlining how regulation of Vioxx Agreements would
work, starting by exploring what sanctions will be effective (V.A),
turning then to discuss when and where sanctions should be
implemented (V.B), and finally identifying who should regulate
Vioxx Agreements (V.C). Part V then concludes with a discussion of
why this proposal should be implemented (V.D).
A. Deterring Unethical Vioxx Agreements
What must be done to deter Vioxx Agreements? This initial
question may also be the easiest. Because the function of sanctions in
the context of this proposal is to motivate plaintiffs’ lawyers to
zealously represent their clients, any action that discourages ethics

160. Defense attorneys and state court judges should also be sanctioned for participation in
problematic Vioxx Agreements (for, respectively, proposing and approving such problematic
arrangements). Article III limits the consequences that may be directed at federal judges.
161. To my knowledge, no other scholarship has considered using ethical sanctions to
influence the deterrence value of tort law, let alone in this context.
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violations (at least of the sort that relate to zealous representation)
will be effective. This could include fines, limitations on practice,
and disbarment, as well as reprimands from either the bench or from
ethics committees. So long as the consequences are sufficiently
unpleasant to adequately deter, it does not matter exactly what that
punishment is.162 It is even possible that news coverage of
settlements or outreach by public interest groups could have an
impact on the ethical quality of the plaintiffs’ bar in this context,
whether such public efforts would shame lawyers into better
practices or whether lawyers would cease unethical behaviors for
fear of losing future clients and referrals.163
The effects of such public shaming, however, would be limited
by many plaintiffs’ ignorance as to their lawyer’s qualifications.
Fortunately, state bars can help here too, with requirements that
every attorney advertisement publicize a local ethics hotline and
include notice of any sanctions against that attorney. When
consumers know not only that Larry “The Hammer” Rangler will
“fight for YOU,” but have a number to call when Larry seems to be
cheating them (and the knowledge that he has been sanctioned on
three previous occasions), plaintiffs’ influence in discouraging
problematic lawyering, and therefore in balancing the tort law
deterrence equation, will grow.
Moreover, because the primary goal of these sanctions is
deterrence, rather than retribution or corrective justice, it is possible
that as few as a handful of high-profile, highly punitive sanctioning
actions will be sufficient to bring plaintiffs’ lawyering back into
compliance with the Model Rules in the context of Vioxx
Agreements. Should plaintiffs’ lawyers become widely aware that
the consequence for their failure to zealously represent the best
interests of all of their clients could be disbarment or sanction,
deterrence may follow even if draconian penalties are only used a
handful of times. Thus, the actions of only a small handful of ethics
162. This flexibility also means that a state bar short on funding can use fines to support its
ethics enforcement.
163. The small group of elite plaintiffs firms that repeatedly handle large class actions would
be most impacted by such measures: reputation, for these firms, is a valuable business commodity
insofar as it ensures that they will continue to be appointed lead counsel in large mass actions.
Because of the importance of reputation to these firms, however, they are also less likely to
engage in these problematic practices in the first place.
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regulators164 may be sufficient to successfully enact this Article’s
proposed reform; punishing only even the most egregious of conduct
may be enough to solve the underlying problem—so long, of course,
as the word gets out.
B. Deterring Only Unethical Vioxx Agreements
Ensuring that it is predominantly unethical behavior that is
deterred is, unfortunately, somewhat more challenging. Not every
aggrieved plaintiffs’ claim should become a publicity spectacle, nor
should every ethics complaint be prosecuted; there are many
excellent plaintiffs’ lawyers who do consistently act in their clients’
best interests. Blindly punishing those who engage in non-class mass
settlements will stifle creativity among even well-meaning lawyers,
potentially bringing mass settlement to a halt in the context of mass
torts.
So when and where should regulators act? Which mass tort
settlement agreement terms and what lawyer behaviors should raise
the hackles of potential regulators? This is no easy question, and the
subtleties of its answer must ultimately be played out on a case-bycase basis by ethics regulators. Fortunately, Rule 23 presents a handy
guide as to what constitutes a fair settlement structure, and it may
serve, at least, as a starting framework for potential regulators
rooting out problematic settlement terms. As this Article extensively
discussed in Part II, Rule 23 carefully balances the involved parties’
interests in efficiency, fairness, and finality together with society’s
interest in deterring future accidents.
Should defendants be permitted to craft a non-class action
aggregate settlement “class” that includes a small number of strong
claims with a predominantly weak “class” that defines the recovery
(in violation of Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement), the result
will be a settlement that is both unfair to those plaintiffs with
stronger claims and insufficient to properly deter future mass torts.165
This same injustice could result if such a “class” included named
plaintiffs whose claims were atypical of the “class” as a whole (in

164. See supra Parts IV, V.A, for a discussion of the ethical violations inherent in Vioxx
Agreements.
165. See supra Part IV.
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violation of Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement).166 And, in
addition to the already-discussed risk of “sweetheart” deals
propagating in the absence of judicial oversight over plaintiffs’
lawyers,167 agreements that elevate less-competent plaintiffs’ lawyers
to the position of lead counsel for the purposes of attaining
defendant-favorable terms (in violation of Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy
of representation requirement) could similarly result in smaller total
settlements and less overall deterrence. Potential regulators should
therefore be very suspicious of any proposed non-class aggregate
settlement with terms that would not pass scrutiny under Rule
23(a).168
But most troubling would be agreements made in violation of
Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b) restricts no-opt-out classes to a very
particular set of circumstances and is therefore especially critical to
ensuring fairness in non-class mass settlements.169 If settlement
groups best described by 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(3) (both of which permit
opt-outs) are effectively prohibited from opting out from the
agreement—as was the case for the Vioxx Agreement170—smaller
settlements and substantial injustice could result. Particular scrutiny
should be devoted to these so-called “Vioxx Agreements”: non-class
aggregate settlements that seek to prevent opting-out in
circumstances where injunctive relief is not sought.
One final characteristic that should prompt scrutiny is an
agreement’s lack of meaningful neutral third-party oversight to the
settlement (thereby implicitly violating any of the numerous
provisions in Rule 23 indicating that oversight and enforcement is
provided by “the court”). As obviously problematic as this may
seem, it would not even be unprecedented: for example, BP placed
its own employee in the role of the “neutral” arbiter in disbursing the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility funds following the Deepwater Horizon
spill.171 There are many different forms that such a problematic
166. See supra Part II.C.1.
167. See supra Part II.B; see also Coffee, supra note 8, at 883 (discussing the implications of
“sweetheart” settlements).
168. See supra Part II.C.1.
169. See supra Part II.C.2.
170. See supra Part II.C.2. For a discussion of the Vioxx Agreement’s “all or nothing” clause,
see, supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
171. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a
Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 838 (2011) (describing many of the
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characteristic of an agreement could take, but ethics regulators would
be well-advised to look closely at any agreement made and disbursed
outside of the supervision of a neutral arbiter who effectively
possessed most of a judge’s tools for ensuring fairness.
So long as potential ethics regulators reserve sanction for those
agreements that fail to adhere to Rule 23’s guidelines, sanctioning
would-be crafters of the next Vioxx Agreement will prevent abuse of
non-class mass settlements without stifling settlement altogether.
Thus, sanctions and the free market can fill the need for fair and
adequate mass settlement where Rule 23 class actions are no longer
permitted or appropriate.
C. Finding Accountability’s Administrators
Having described what will deter untoward Vioxx Agreements,
and when and where deterrence should be applied, this Article
completes its analysis of how to defer Vioxx Agreements by
exploring who these regulators should be. There are two primary
challenges to effective ethics regulation in such a context: (1)
identifying effective ethics regulators, and (2) motivating these
regulators to actually regulate. Entire law review articles have been
devoted to the topic of ethics enforcement. This Article will therefore
not attempt to provide a comprehensive map to ethics reform—that
must be the subject of a different article—but will rather briefly
outline who could feasibly regulate Vioxx Agreements.
1. Who Are the Ethics Regulators?
The lax enforcement of ethics rules is a widely known and welldiscussed problem.172 State ethics committees were tasked with
enforcing the rules implicated by the Vioxx Agreement itself, and yet
did little to insist on strict ethical compliance. Fortunately, ethics
committees are not the only entities with the knowledge, motivation,
or authority to uphold the ethical practice of law; judges, too, can be
ethics regulators. Unfortunately, judges also are reluctant arbiters of
problems underlying the structure of the Deepwater Horizon claims resolution process, including
Kenneth Feinberg’s disputed “neutral” role as Master of this fund).
172. See, e.g., Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 825–26 (2004); Patrick J.
Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral
Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 707 (1998).
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ethics violations and act infrequently in the face of potentially
sanctionable or referable conduct. There is a third potential means by
which ethics regulation may be achieved: if breaking ethical rules is
a bad business proposition, lawyers will self-regulate. Thus, the
public at-large, through the influence it exerts on prospective clients,
provides some regulating force on plaintiffs lawyers.
There are a number of explanations for why effective ethics
regulation does not currently spring from any of these sources.173
Two primary reasons for this non-regulation, each implicated by
Vioxx Agreements, are precedent and transparency. First, judges and
ethics committees are predominantly lawyers, and are therefore
trained to defer to precedent. Even though ethics precedent is
generally not binding, judges and committees are lax ethics enforcers
because—in part—lax enforcement is the norm.174 Neither judges
nor ethics committees wish to be accused of inconsistency or
favoritism in their enforcement, and the rare use of sanctions has
rendered what should be a regular practice an exception instead.
Second is the transparency problem: ethics committees can only
discipline infractions that are brought to their attention. As the
academic literature has recognized, a substantial obstacle to ethics
enforcement is the identification of potential violators: “Only after
the identification function is improved are prosecutorial and
adjudicatory procedures and policies of primary importance. Without
adequate information input, the system cannot attend to, because it
does not know about, the majority of instances of lawyers’
misconduct.”175 Consequently, a lack of transparency regarding
potential rules-breaking will hamper the effective regulation of ethics
rules.
173. At least, in general. Some judges and ethics committees are, of course, stricter than
others.
174. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics—I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 470 (2001) (describing the absence of
regulation that has defined the majority of the practice of law).
175. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 1005 (1976); see also AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 168 (1970) (discussing the problems caused by the failure of
attorneys and judges to report misconduct); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to
Report Other Lawyers’ Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95
(1976); Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession,
48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 282 (1970).
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Ethics committees primarily receive information regarding
ethics violations from three sources: (1) the lawyers’ clients, (2) the
public, or (3) another lawyer.176 Of these sources, lawyers’ clients—
usually plaintiffs—contribute a substantial proportion, if not an
outright majority, of all ethics references.177 Unfortunately, although
references from plaintiffs are key to ethics committees, plaintiffs
often understand little about the law, their case, or their lawyers, and
are therefore rarely empowered to demand change.178 And because
class action lawyers typically solicit potential plaintiffs, and not viceversa, market pressures from discerning plaintiffs are only a weak
influence on lawyer behavior.179 Similarly, neither the public at-large
nor other lawyers constitute a significant check against unethical
behavior. The public usually lacks both the knowledge and the will
to refer violating lawyers to ethics committees.180 And lawyers
generally choose not to report potential ethics violations: lawyers are
uniquely able to “rationalize a breach as less than substantial by
some defensible theory,”181 have a sense of solidarity with their
colleagues on the bar,182 and are influenced by society’s
stigmatization of whistleblowers.183 Thus, very little pressure
currently exists to regulate potential ethics violators. But fortunately,
as will be discussed, there are several parties who are in a strong
position to monitor Vioxx Agreements.
2. How Do We Motivate Regulators to Regulate?
These obstacles present a practical problem for this Article’s
normative proposal; that strict ethics enforcement is advantageous

176. John Levy, The Judge’s Role in the Enforcement of Ethics—Fear and Learning in the
Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 103 (1982). Levy also discusses a fourth potential
avenue of reference: some sort of legal professional law enforcement. However, as there is
currently no ethics police, this final avenue for ethics references will be tabled for the remainder
of the present Article; although an ethics police could be an ideal means of (un)ethical references
of Vioxx Arrangements, it remains strictly hypothetical.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Coffee, supra note 8, at 886.
180. Levy, supra note 176, at 103.
181. “In common parlance and even in law review articles, pejorative terms such as ‘squeal,’
‘rat,’ ‘stool pigeon,’ and ‘gestapo’ are used freely.” Id. at 104–05 (noting also that “The Clark
Report found ‘outright hostility’ from the practicing bar toward disciplinary enforcement”).
182. Levy, supra note 176, at 104.
183. Id.
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does not necessarily mean it is feasible. But all hope is not lost! The
novel structure of Vioxx Agreements mitigates at least some of the
existing major bars to effective ethics regulation. This Article does
not propose that the structure of such Agreements, alone, subjects
Agreements to sufficient regulation: as the Vioxx Agreement itself
demonstrates, the market is not currently self-regulating. Rather, as
this section explains, the reforms proposed in this Article are
attainable, should motivated regulators or public interest groups
desire to purse such change.
First, the novelty of Vioxx Agreements should diminish the
limiting effect precedent has on effective ethics regulation. The
emergence of a new category of settlement presents an opportunity
for ethics regulators—whether they are ethics committees or
judges—to engage anew. There has not yet been a sufficient
propagation of Vioxx Agreements for either precedent or reputation
to develop, so regulators may regulate Vioxx Agreements without
feeling that they are disregarding precedent or fearing that they will
be accused of inconsistency or favoritism.
Second, the unusual and novel structure of Vioxx Agreements
should attract greater scrutiny from ethics committees, judges, other
members of the bar, the public at large, and even the claimants
themselves. The information limitation on regulators’ ability to
regulate, therefore, will be less of a bar to ethics scrutiny in the
context of Vioxx Agreements than it might be in other contexts;
regulating lawyers and judges will be more predisposed to suspicion
of these unusual settlements than more staid forms of settlement, and
will presumably hesitate less to refer potential violators for sanction.
The public, in turn, is more likely to be engaged, as the novel legal
structures applied should attract greater press attention184—although
engagement from uninvolved parties is likely to remain low. Finally,
the mass nature of these settlements effectively guarantees that some
claimants will believe that they have received the short end of the
stick. And, especially if ethics regulators become a more involved
presence in the context of mass settlement, a number of these newly
184. Soo Yeon Hong, Gatekeeping of News Releases: The Gap Between the Selection and the
Prominence of News Releases, ALLACADEMIC RES., 1 (2007), available at http://citation
.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/2/8/6/pages172866/p172866-7.php
(noting that “unexpectedness” is a major factor in newsworthiness).
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minted complainants will inevitably find their way to ethics
committees.
In fact, many of these effects have already begun to manifest as
ethics regulators have thus far been relatively, albeit still
insufficiently, engaged in overseeing novel settlement arrangements.
State ethics committees have shown an increasing willingness in
recent years to sanction plaintiffs’ attorneys who abuse their clients’
trust in the context of mass tort settlements,185 and judges have
shown a similarly increased willingness to police plaintiffs’ attorneys
who do not act in the best interest of their clients.186 A bar of
attorneys specializing in challenging improper settlements, even, has
begun to emerge.187
This is not to say that disciplinary committees or other potential
regulators are sure to act in this context. What will most likely
happen is more of the same.188 And the scrutiny currently being
applied to Vioxx Agreements falls far short of that necessary to
effectuate the reform proposed in this Article. But this Article is not
merely descriptive but normative. What should happen is more
regulation of Vioxx Agreements. And as this Article has described,
the reaction of lawyers and judges to novel settlements thus far does
show potential for sufficient reform. Even a single action could get
regulators’ attention and jump-start the institution of effective
measures. This could take the form of a high-profile sanction or
something more unusual—such as a civil suit filed by plaintiffs or
some federal involvement, such as a criminal prosecution of the
settling lawyers or an investigation of a settlement agreement by a

185. See, e.g., Jon Newberry, Stan Chesley “Counsel in Chief” in Fen-Phen, CINCINNATI
BUS. COURIER (Jun. 17, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/print-edition/2011/03/04
/stan-chesley-counsel-in-chief-in.html?page=all.
186. In fact, it was the threat of judicial action, in part, that likely motivated Judge Fallon’s
involvement in the Vioxx Agreement.
187. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers for Cases Involving Insufficient Settlements, SCHIFF
GORMAN LLC, http://www.sgattorneymalpractice.com/Legal-Malpractice-Services/Insufficient
-Settlements.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2003); Improper Settlement, FLORIDA MALPRACTICE
LAWS., http://www.sdtriallaw.com/PracticeAreas/Improper-Settlement.asp (last visited Aug. 24,
2014); LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW., http://www.legal-malpractice-law.com/improper-settlement/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
188. The track record of disciplinary authorities in other high-stakes areas leaves much to be
desired; despite the problems that have emerged in corporate practice, for example, authorities
have done little.

MASS TORT

Fall 2014]

4/21/2015 9:51 PM

MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS

51

consumer protection agency.189 Sufficient regulation is, therefore,
within reach;190 with some additional will, a sufficient regime of
sanctions may be enacted.
D. Accountability’s Advantages
Thus far this Article has presented a problem and a solution. In
closing, it will briefly discuss not merely how this solution should be
adopted, but why it should. Why is it that sanctioning plaintiffs’
lawyers will remedy the problems that have begun to arise from
Amchem and Ortiz’s restriction of Rule 23 certification? Nearly all of
the structural problems that arise in the absence of Rule 23’s
protections are due to breakdowns in plaintiffs’ representation and
the cross-incentives facing plaintiffs and their attorneys.191 Zealous
advocacy from the plaintiffs’ bar will close much of the gap between
those resolutions that are made within the confines of Rule 23 and
those that are made without.192
189. See Ted Frank, George Cohen’s Letter to the FTC Re the Vioxx Settlement,
POINTOFLAW.COM (Jan. 22 2008, 12:11 PM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/004680
.php#4680 (arguing to the FTC that the Vioxx Agreement was an antitrust violation because the
participating lawyers were effectively conspiring to refuse to represent lawyers who opted out of
the Agreement).
190. As was previously noted, see supra note 160, one other ripe target for regulation may be
the defense attorneys who propose these problematic arrangements. A sophisticated mass-tort
defense bar has arisen, and a small number of firms dominate products liability mass-tort defense.
Even a single sanction or reprimand, therefore, could have a significant impact on the practices of
these lawyers. Although the legal or ethical obligations of defense lawyers to only participate in
agreements that preserve the rights of plaintiffs may not be as strong as that of plaintiffs’ lawyers,
ethical regulators may nevertheless be able to hold defense lawyer drafters of problematic
agreements responsible. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 361, 388 (2002) (noting that “[d]rafting the instrument effecting the harm is the step beyond
advice that would expose the lawyer to possible liability for the consequences of misdeeds in
which he or she actively participated”); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie of Lawyers’ Ethics in
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 588 (1975) (noting that lawyers have no right to right or duty to
assist a client in unconscionable conduct); see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 686 (1978) (“In measuring the possible
liability for lawyers who write standard form contracts, it is important to distinguish between
advising a client that a particular term in a form contract might not be unconscionable and serving
the client by drafting an unconscionable provision intended to impede enforcement of citizens’
rights.”).
191. See supra Part IV.B. Defense lawyers are no less responsible for these problems. And as
has been discussed, sanctions directed at defense lawyers will similarly be effective in curbing
problematic practices. See supra notes 160, 190. But because defense lawyers’ responsibility may
not extend to the formal ethical or legal arena, discussion of this Article’s proposal will focus
primarily on the impact on plaintiffs’ lawyers.
192. As has been discussed, sanctioning defense lawyers or state judges would be a similarly
effective, albeit a more difficult to enact, remedy. See supra note 160.
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First, plaintiffs’ attorneys will resist the formation of settlement
classes that hide the claims of strong plaintiffs behind weak or
unrepresentative named plaintiffs if the price for their lackluster
representation is disbarment. This will motivate plaintiffs’ lawyers to
push for the most favorable possible class composition for their
clients, contributing to a healthy dialogue that will better inform
supervising judges of the varying interests implicated by the class
structure. Any lawyer failing to adequately represent her client in this
manner would risk violating a number of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, including the conflicts of interest rules
(1.8),193 counselor rules (2.1),194 and the Rules’ general requirement
of zealous advocacy.195 Rule 23(a) may not be entirely resurrected in
such non-Rule 23 agreements by the threat of mere sanctions alone,
but the heart of its protections would be essentially preserved.196
Second, plaintiffs’ attorneys facing a severe regime of sanctions
will not hesitate to opt out of agreements unfavorable to their clients’
interests. In addition to the Model Rules implicated when Rule 23(a)
is not applied, plaintiffs’ lawyers who fail to opt their clients out of
unfavorable settlements that would otherwise fall under Rule 23(b)
likely violate the rules requiring the exercise of independent
judgment (2.1) and unrestricted practice (5.6).197 Although the
heightened requirements of 23(b)(3) could be difficult to replicate
with sanctions alone, Rule 23(b)’s protections may at least be
partially
organically
recreated
by
ensuring
adequate
198
representation.
Third, the structural oversights provided by 23(e)(2) and (g) that
prevent attorneys from taking advantage of their clients will be far
less necessary if there are sanctions motivating faithful advocacy.199
Rather, an aggressive regime of sanctions would largely—if not
entirely—supplant any formal protections from the greed of
193. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 (Discussion Draft 1980).
194. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1.
195. See, e.g., id. at Preamble.
196. See supra Part II.C.1.
197. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1, 5.6 (2011).
198. See supra Part II.C.2. There will likely remain some issues associated with resolving
limited-fund settlements where the fund really is limited. Bankruptcy may prove to be a superior
tool for such circumstances. See Troy McKenzie, Towards a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (2012).
199. See supra Part II.C.3.
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plaintiffs’ lawyers. A plaintiff’s lawyer operating in her own best
interest would not lead her client astray were she faced with a
reasonable possibility of severe punishment for her actions.
Fourth, although sanctions may not decrease the use of Vioxx
Agreements, they could simplify the administration of such private
arrangements. Faced with a real possibility of discipline, the lawyers
structuring these agreements will be more likely to follow the tested
and established guidelines of Rule 23. This will not merely increase
the equitability and deterrence value of non-Rule 23 settlements, but
will require judges to come to terms with far fewer novel or creative
structures. Moreover, plaintiffs’ lawyers will insist on more active
judicial management of these arrangements, and overseeing judges
will oblige, preferring their names not be associated with sanctioned
arrangements. This will therefore simultaneously decrease the strain
of overseeing novel non-Rule 23 arrangements on the judiciary while
increasing the judiciary’s ability to effectively manage and police
those private arrangements.
In sum, although these changes may not impact the economic
disadvantages to plaintiffs inherent in the Supreme Court’s limiting
Rule 23 jurisprudence—since plaintiffs’ threats of litigation and trial
will continue to have less credibility200—for the reasons described,
this Article’s proposal will significantly improve our current
sanction-less world of Vioxx Agreements. Assuring plaintiffs
adequate representation will go a long way to ameliorating the
injustices that plaintiffs will otherwise face outside of Rule 23, and it
will restore much of the deterrence power of group litigation.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys acting in the best interest of their clients will
refuse to sign on to agreements that create plaintiff classes that
disadvantage those participating in a manner prohibited by Rule
23(a). Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys will steer plaintiffs clear of
class agreements prohibiting opt-outs in situations other than those
encapsulated by Rule 23(b)(2). Although some deterrence value will
remain lost, due to the diminished bargaining position of plaintiffs
who cannot threaten a class action lawsuit, aggressive sanctions
against plaintiffs’ lawyers will close much of the remaining gap
between such extra-judicial agreements and Rule 23 settlements.

200. See discussion supra Part IV, p. 37.
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This is the lesson learned from the Fen-Phen litigation. In
Kentucky, before any national class action settlement could be
negotiated, state courts certified a 400-plaintiff class.201 To avoid the
prospect of a costly trial, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals negotiated a
settlement with a number of plaintiffs’ attorneys, agreeing to a $200
million settlement supervised by a Kentucky judge. The judge,
however, was too close with the plaintiffs’ attorneys and accepted an
agreement that gave nearly half of the settlement to just three
lawyers as attorney fees.202 Ultimately, the judge was disbarred and
two of the attorneys were convicted of defrauding their clients.203
Although the Kentucky Fen-Phen settlement may have been a
failure, the message it sent to attorneys was clear: settle in your own
interests at your own peril.204 Thus, the Fen-Phen failed settlement
was a sweeping success for the management of a just judiciary. But
even more aggressive management of lawyers is necessary in the
context of non-Rule 23 mass settlements, not merely due to the
possibility of ethical transgressions, but due to the inevitable impact
that the loss of Rule 23’s protections will have on the deterrence
value of mass settlements outside of the formal class action
framework.
Fortunately, inadequacies in representation need not rise to the
level seen in the Fen-Phen litigation before sanctions may be used;
jurisdictions seeking to crack down on under-deterring Vioxx
Agreements do not need to look far to find attorney ethical
violations. The Vioxx Agreement was remarkably well-crafted yet,
as previously discussed, it implicated Rules 1.16(b), 1.2(a), 2.1, and
5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.205 Other privately
crafted agreements will likely implicate additional ethical rules.206
201. Joe Tort, Kentucky Fen-Phen Lawyers Given Long Prison Sentences, MASS TORT LITIG.
BLOG (Aug. 18, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass_tort_litigation/2009/08/kentucky
-fenphen-lawyers-given-long-prison-sentences.html.
202. Debra Cassens Weiss, Former Judge Disbarred for Approving Fen-Phen Settlement
Without Checking the Details, ABA J. (Oct. 28, 2011, 9:43 AM), http://www.abajournal.com
/news/article/former_judge_disbarred_for_approving_fen-phen_settlement_without_checking_t/.
203. Id.
204. David G. Arganian, The Cautionary Tale of Plaintiffs Attorney Stan Chelsey, L. OFFS. OF
DAVID ARGANIAN, http://dwi-counsel.com/news/21.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (describing
how one of the disbarred attorneys has long been a controversial figure in the mass-tort world due
to his predilection for “elbow[ing] his way into cases and then settl[ing] them too early”).
205. See supra Part IV.
206. Such as MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.8, and 5.4—as discussed above.

MASS TORT

Fall 2014]

4/21/2015 9:51 PM

MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS

55

By seeking significant sanctions as well as disbarment for ethical
violations, localities would go a long way toward discouraging
lawyers from contracting with defendants in ways adverse to their
clients’ interests, a practice that could even itself be barred outright.
This solution will allow Vioxx Agreements to continue to meet the
needs of group litigation—curtailing extrajudicial group dispute
resolution will leave plaintiffs’ injuries unremunerated and
defendants unable to ensure finality, and will produce negative
societal externalities207—without substantially sacrificing group
litigation’s deterrence value. By ensuring that the hard-working and
creative attorneys crafting these agreements adhere to the spirit of
Rule 23, the threat of sanctions will facilitate non-class mass
settlements in the free market that match, or even exceed, Rule 23 in
protecting the various interests of defendants, plaintiffs, and society.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court takes ever more restrictive positions with
respect to Rule 23 class certification, mass tort settlements will
continue to move toward private contractual arrangements like the
Vioxx Agreement. Ironically, although Amchem and Ortiz
represented an unequivocal victory for proceduralists, the emergence
of Vioxx Agreements in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Rule
23 jurisprudence will do far more procedural damage than the preAmchem and Ortiz jurisprudence ever could.208 Although ensuring a
healthy settlement class without triggering obvious ethical objections
will generally entail the involvement of judges in some capacity,
judicial oversight of these private agreements will not as rigorously
protect plaintiffs as Rule 23 and CAFA currently do. This is not to
say that these regulations effectuate good, or even adequate,
protection, but rather that Vioxx Agreements will offer even less.
The primary result of this will be the systemic under-deterrence of
future harm resulting, in large part, from the inadequate
representation of plaintiffs—an unfortunate consequence of
insufficient judicial oversight and the elimination of Rules 23(a)(4),
(e)(2), and (g). Therefore, the market has provided a solution to mass
torts’ loss of Rule 23, but it is a solution that itself must be cured.
207. See supra Part II.
208. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 1926–27.
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Although a complete revision of Rule 23 could resolve this
dangerous consequence of Amchem and Ortiz, a far simpler solution
would be to enforce sanctions against those plaintiffs’ lawyers who
fail to sufficiently protect classes in non-Rule 23 group settlements.
State bar associations, ethics boards, and judges can and should act
assertively to prevent inadequate representation and oversight in the
non-Rule 23 settlements that will proliferate in the aftermath of
Amchem and Ortiz.

